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Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?

Mathew Maavak¹

ABSTRACT

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Once-inexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

INTRODUCTION

The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA).

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and self-sustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998).

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020).

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An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity.

COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a).

As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach.

METHODOLOGY

An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

- Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);
- Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012);
- Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and
- Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012)

Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.

ECONOMY

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozd (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid-2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.




Figure 1: Systemic Emergence of Global Risks

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed \$255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering \$2.5 *quadrillion* (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated *before* the COVID-19 outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented \$10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth \$88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “*An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics*” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO's security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement... I guarantee that if something happens, we won't see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let's do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.”
(Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank's gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global *Titanics* – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective \$1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you'll own nothing and you'll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the *mise en scene* in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering \$3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world's 3.2 billion workers are increasingly

unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn't this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US\$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world's most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabria-based 'Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a *Black Hawk Down* incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water

resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction-adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

Geopolitics will still be dictated by major powers. However, how will the vast majority of nations fare during this VUCA decade? Many “emerging nations” have produced neither the intelligentsia nor industries required to be future-resilient. Raw materials and cheap labour cannot sustain anaemic societies in a volatile world. Advances in material sciences and robotic automation as well as technological “ephemeralization” (Fuller, 1938; Heylighen, 2002) may shift manufacturing back to the Developed World.

In an attempt to mask the looming redundancy of these nations, untold billions have been wasted on vanity studies, conferences and technological initiatives drawn up by an army of neoliberal experts and native proxies. Risks were rarely part of the planning calculus. National and regional blueprints ranging from Malaysia’s Vision 2020, Saudi Vision 2030, ASEAN 2025 to Africa 2030, amongst others, will fail just as their innumerable precursors did.

The author defines a redundant nation as *one which persistently lacks a comprehensive brain bank and an adaptive governance structure in order to be future-resilient*. Redundant nations are preludes to failed states. They will lack native ideations and coherent policies that are critically needed in a VUCA decade. While policies intended to “promote growth in developing countries” had traditionally acted “as agents for conflict prevention” (Humphreys, 2003), the trade-off was often bureaucratic overgrowth, corruption, ethnoreligious discrimination and resource wastages.

Attempts to re-use these nations as geopolitical proxies *a la* the Cold War may prove too costly for potential sponsors. The Fat Leonard scandal (Whitlock, 2016) in Southeast Asia – which entrapped senior US naval officers in a web of sleaze – may be a harbinger of similar breaches on friendly territory, particularly as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) challenges US geopolitical hegemony worldwide. The BRI however snakes through many potentially-

redundant nations and may expose China to a “death by a thousand cuts” via geo-economic extortion. Beijing’s recent attempts to portray itself as a humanitarian superpower has somewhat backfired after numerous defects were discovered in its “medical aid” exports (Kern, 2020).

Ultimately, one should not underestimate the possibility, however remote, of national boundaries being redrawn before the Great Reset period is over. The global map was different only 100 years back. The once-mighty Soviet Union no longer exists while its former nemesis, the United States, faces social clefs of ominous proportions. Alarming parallels are now being drawn between the inauguration of President Abraham Lincoln on March 4, 1861 – which led to the US civil war – and the swearing in of Joe Biden as 46th President of United States on Jan 20 2021 (Waxman, 2021). How will a weakened United States affect NATO and the larger Western-led global alliance?

SOCIETAL

The WEF (2017) had pencilled “global social instability” as the biggest threat facing our collective future. A similar outcome was gamed out in a 2007 study by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre at the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (DCDC, 2007).

According to Peter Turchin (2016), a professor of Evolutionary Biology at the University of Connecticut, the United States may experience “a period of heightened social and political instability during the 2020s” – marked by governmental dysfunction, societal gridlock and rampant political polarization. To blame this phenomenon on the presidency of Donald J. Trump is to wilfully ignore the gradual build-up of various fissiparous forces over decades.

The social media plays a force multiplier role here. While risks metastasize at the bedrock levels of society, policymakers are constantly distracted from the task of governance by a daily barrage of recriminations, fake news and social media agitprops. As a result, long-term policy imperatives are routinely sacrificed for immediate political gains. The importunate presidential impeachment sagas and electoral fraud accusations in the United States are reflective of wider social fissures, state fragilities and policy paralyses worldwide.

There is nothing new in this *panem et circenses* (bread and circuses) phenomenon. Juvenal had noted a similar trend during Rome’s imperial decline circa 100 A.D. Recently, despite clear signals that the world was facing an economic catastrophe, the United Nations seemed more focused on the discovery of gender bias in virtual assistant software like Siri and Alexa (UNESCO, 2019). How will this revelation benefit the bottom 99% of humanity in dire economic conditions; one where the victims will be preponderantly women and children?

Just like in Imperial Rome, bread and circuses are symptomatic of an economic system that relentlessly benefits the elite. The mountain is ignored and the molehill is prioritized through controlled public narratives. The issue of “stolen childhoods”, for example, is now couched in terms of climate change rather than on sexual exploitation. Few take note that nearly “100,000 children – girls and boys – are bought and sold for sex in the U.S. every year, with as many as 300,000 children in danger of being trafficked each year.” Child rape, as John

Whitehead (2020) further notes, has become “Big Business in America.” Not surprisingly, human trafficking has emerged as a \$150 billion global industry (Niethammer, 2020).

Such shocking human rights failures do not figure prominently in the calculus of various “social justice” movements. The Top 1% needs their “useful idiots” – a phrase misattributed to Lenin – to generate a constant supply of distractions. Activist-billionaire George Soros, for example, is pumping \$1 billion into a global university network to “fight climate change” and “dictators” which curiously include elected leaders such as former US President Donald J. Trump and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. These “academically excellent but politically endangered scholars” (Open Society, 2020), as Soros calls them, may turn out to be the very disruptors who will “*undermine scientific progress*” in the West – just as Turchin (2016) predicted in his seminal study. Soros’ pledge was coincidentally made when COVID-19 began to decimate the global economy and healthcare systems.

Elite philanthropy is now an avenue for global subversion. An assortment of scholars, government officials and NGOs are already channelling the agendas of their well-pocketed patrons, backed by Big Tech’s control of the mainstream and social media (Maavak, 2020c). Their narratives are reminiscent of giddy sophistries which fuelled a variety of communist and anarchist movements during the build-up to WWII.

Under these circumstances, some nations may eventually seal their borders and initiate authoritarian measures in order to maintain internal stability. This is no longer an unthinkable proposition as dissatisfaction with democracy has peaked worldwide (Foa et al, 2020). Measures perfected by COVID-19 lockdowns may have inadvertently served as a test run in this regard.

TECHNOLOGICAL

Job displacements caused by automation, robotics and Artificial Intelligence will be a fait accompli. The foundations of our global Technopia are alarmingly propped by neo-slavery and coding worth \$9 per hour, leading to disasters such as the recent Boeing 737 Max fiasco (Maavak, 2019b).

While technological ephemeralization exacerbates Black Swan-type risks (Maavak, 2019b); the Internet of Things (IoT) doubles up as a playground for cyber-savvy malcontents. Consider the following cyber-facilitated crime sequence: vehicles are sent on a collision course to freeze traffic while a truck rams into a sensitive entry point at a bank. A drone-borne electromagnetic pulse (EMP) device disables all nearby surveillance systems even as communications systems are compromised to send police in the wrong direction. That is just an illustration of the tech-enabled crime of the future. Malware can now be stored inside a strand of DNA. Biohackers can unleash a CRISPR-engineered COVID-XX from the comfort of their homes. Attempts at creating a gene-engineered super society, like the one China is attempting, may backfire horribly but not before other nations jump into the fray (Greenberg, 2017; Regalado, 2016; Maavak, 2020b).

In the pre-coronavirus era, the fortunes of Big Tech were significantly generated by “surveillance capitalism”; one where private data from billions of individuals were indiscriminately harvested, repackaged and sold off as invaluable “business insights” (Zuboff,

2019). This is the basis for what is now called Big Data Analytics (BDA). COVID-19 has legitimized this racket through a panoply of “contact tracing” tools that have shoddy levels of security. Recently, four-terabytes of sensitive data belonging to 1.2 billion people was discovered on an unsecured Google Cloud server (Newman, 2019). The identity of the owner remains a mystery.

When another Great Depression does occur, there will be fewer businesses, products and advertisements to sustain Big Tech’s free email and social media platforms. Will the provision of such services be left to governments or will Big Tech be bailed out in their trillions? COVID-19 has transposed this radical hypothesis into a rapidly emerging reality. How will society function without the basic means of communications that were largely gratis till now (Maavak, 2019b)? One could argue that the bailout is already occurring as governments increasingly cede control of the public narrative, means of communications and COVID-19 response measures to Big Tech.

Mass interconnectivity is also creating complex vulnerabilities in our infrastructure systems. As Choo, Smith & McCusker (2007, p.2) warned:

Tight couplings between different areas of critical infrastructure (CI) – information technology and communications, banking and finance, water, energy and utilities, transportation, mass gatherings, food, and emergency services – may result in rapid escalation of seemingly modest disruptions from within one sector to others. If insecure sectors are compromised, they can then be used as launching pads to attack other CI sectors.

Cyber-couplings are becoming tighter and more complex with each passing year. We may reach a point where cybersecurity is subsumed into a larger panoptic complex in a VUCA world. Access to a variety of services and products, including the Internet itself, may be contingent on real-time biometric validation (Maavak, 2019b). Such measures may be introduced as a desperate, real-time response to contain successive waves of COVID-19. It may thereafter acquire several levels of function creep until privacy is reduced to a bygone vestigial ideal.

Alternately, the Internet may undergo radical fragmentation in some parts of the world. As China perfects its Great Firewall and social credit systems, the Wuhan outbreak has demonstrated its ability to electronically lock down hundreds of millions of people. Russia, in the meantime, is creating an entirely new national Intranet system from scratch. The Runet, as it is called, has the potential to operate independently of the World Wide Web in order to buffer the state against a variety of Western sanctions and exogenous cyberattacks (Maavak, 2019b).

CONCLUSION

Complex risks require complex adaptive responses. Due to its transcendental qualities, global risks cannot be tackled through a Cartesian or siloed approach.

It is also a damning indictment of this era that hardly any faculty, graduate or post-doctoral program exist on the study of trans-sectoral global risks. The WEF, which specializes in this area, appears incapacitated by the portents ahead. The 2020 Davos session, themed an

insipid “Stakeholders for a Cohesive and Sustainable World” (WEF, 2020), was ironically held against the backdrop of the COVID-19 outbreak.

COVID-19 has also exposed an institutional lack of “multiple motors of adaptation” (Eisenhardt & Piezunka, 2011) among governments – leading to the 21st century paradox where the greater the local volatility; the louder the call for global governance by elitist institutions that are perennially detached from native realities.

Table 1, below, exemplifies this detachment. The Global Health Security Index, published in October 2019 as “*the first comprehensive assessment of global health security capabilities in 195 countries*” (GHS Index, 2019, p.5) was grossly flawed in light of the coronavirus pandemic outbreak two months later.

The index was developed by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in collaboration with The Economist Intelligence Unit. Its major funders were the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Open Philanthropy Project and the Robertson Foundation. How could a welter of experts and prestigious institutions, who set detailed metrics and parameters in their study, get it so wrong? With the exception of Thailand and Sweden, the 15 “most prepared nations” are the ones now reeling from COVID-19. China, once the global epicentre for COVID-19, was the only nation to register an actual GDP growth for the year 2020 (Bloomberg, 2021). Singapore, another success story, was also notably missing from the list.

Rank	Country	Index Score (1-100)	Region	Population	Income
1	United States	83.5	Northern America	100m+	High income
2	United Kingdom	77.9	Europe	50-100m	High income
3	Netherlands	75.6	Europe	10-50m	High income
4	Australia	75.5	Oceania	10-50m	High income
5	Canada	75.3	Northern America	10-50m	High income
6	Thailand	73.2	Southeastern Asia	50-100m	High income
7	Sweden	72.1	Europe	1-10m	Upper middle income
8	Denmark	70.4	Europe	1-10m	High income
9	South Korea	70.2	Eastern Asia	50-100m	High income
10	Finland	68.7	Europe	1-10m	High income
11	France	68.2	Europe	50-100m	High income
12	Slovenia	67.2	Europe	1-10m	High income
13	Switzerland	67.0	Europe	1-10m	High income
14	Germany	66.0	Europe	50-100m	High income
15	Spain	65.9	Europe	10-50m	High income

Source: <https://www.ghsindex.org/>

Table 1: 2019 Global Health Security Index: Pandemic Preparedness Level

According to Philip Tetlock (2005), the forecasts of experts are often scarcely better than those of laymen. Part of the problem lies with elite philanthropies which deliberately groom “next-generation rubber-stampers for the privileged 0.1%” (Maavak, 2018). These experts “follow the money” and are incapable of providing ideas outside the commissioned elitist agenda.

As a result, the current global order will likely unravel before the decade is over. The primary drivers will be economic, acting primarily through technological agencies. Primary outcomes will be felt in the societal, environmental and geopolitical areas. Only cohesive societies, with extant crisis management ecosystems, will emerge stronger. These are societies that have been historically adept at social mobilization in the face of an existential threat e.g. WWII. Prime examples include Russia, Finland and Israel.

A surge in nationalism (societal) and militarization (geopolitical) should be anticipated during this decade. Trade pacts may eventually be forged outside the WTO framework (economic) and commerce may be contingent on geopolitical non-interference and civilizational affinity. National cyber-defences and electronic interactions (technological) may co-exist with Intranets and panoptic controls. Climate change programs (environmental) may take a backseat to the *crises du jour* during this decade.

Cautionary Notes for Security Professionals

With risks snowballing throughout the interstices of global systems, the intelligence community needs to take stock of multitudinous threats in real-time. Establishing a robust “whole systems” risk detection and mitigation mechanism – specific to national needs and organizational peculiarities – will however take time, as the author discovered during his doctoral research. The basic structure, functions and *modus operandi* of such a mechanism deserves a separate study altogether.

For the time being, security professionals should boost their situational awareness through Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) methods. This task is however getting more difficult as Big Tech censors information that is otherwise invaluable to security professionals. By censoring the digital commons, Big Tech is also effectively neutering the OSINT capabilities of the intelligence community. As the methodology section revealed, “diminishing diversity of actors” (or information) naturally leads to a build-up of risks in a system as traditional checks and balances are removed.

Wherever possible, it is vital to identify the *generators of actionable data* at the open source level. In Tetlock’s (2005) study, these individuals were described as nimble “foxes” as opposed to the scholastically-rigid hedgehogs – a juxtaposition inspired by the ancient Greek poet Archilocus (c. 680 – c. 645 BC). Despite the Big Data hype, the success or failure of Collective Intelligence (CI) in high-octane crisis situations is more dependent on the quality of analyses and analysts rather than on machine-generated insights (Maavak, 2019a). Identifying and co-opting risk-sentient individuals into institutional risk studies is a viable way forward but this may require political support.

It is also worth asking whether a Big Tech-led global oligarchy will even tolerate the existence of various “deep states” in the long run. “Initially, both groupings may cooperate to their mutual benefit but their respective *raison d’être* are too contradictory to be reconciled. One thrives on an “open society” run by obedient hirelings who will administer a global

Ministry of Truth while the other depends on secrecy and a degree of national sovereignty to justify its existence...Surveillance technologies ushered in by the ongoing ‘coronapsychosis’ may end up being the deciding factor” (Maavak, 2020c).

It is high time for security professionals and the intelligence community to wake up to the new reality. If Big Tech can systematically censor and impugn the President of the United States – routinely dubbed as the “most powerful man on earth” – think of the repercussions to both the common and covert domains?

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‘To serve others and do good’: An examination of volunteers in the New South Wales Police Force

Colin Rogers and Emma Wintle¹

ABSTRACT

‘What is the essence of life? To serve others and do good’ (Aristotle attr). Public services across the globe have become increasingly under pressure to deliver more for the same, or at least the same for less in terms of service delivery to the public. Economic downturns, increased demands and national and local societal changes, further exacerbated by a global pandemic, have left public agencies such as the police searching for resources to cope with such changes. One source of assistance, and a chance for people to serve others and do good, is the increased recruitment and use of volunteers to assist regular police officers. However, research upon the use of police volunteers in Australia appears in its infancy, although it is gathering momentum. This article examines the use of volunteers by the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF), along with examining just who the volunteers are, what type of training they receive and to obtain their views on their roles in the NSWPF.

Key Words: Police, Volunteers, New South Wales Police.

INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly changing global environment police agencies across the world are facing enormous challenges to their traditional delivery of services to the public at a local, national and international level. This coupled with economic constraints have forced police agencies to consider the way in which their workforce is structured and to seek on occasions to rationalise their establishment. An example of this was the economic downturn of 2008-2010 which introduced the age of austerity for public services in the United Kingdom (UK), and in particular the Police service which saw a decrease in its public budget of nearly 30% (National Audit Office 2018). Consequently, there was significant restructuring of the workforce which saw a reduction in the number of police officers, community support officers and ancillary workers.

One also cannot ignore the fact that increased problems for policing agencies may occur as a result of environmental and climate change. The recent large-scale bush fires in Australia and long periods of drought may indicate that natural disasters could increase in scale and intensity. Furthermore, the recent COVID-19 pandemic illustrates that increased opportunities for global travel have heightened the possibility of worldwide pandemics. The COVID-19 response in Australia has seen an increased demand on police services, with the role of police extended to enforce new public health directions aimed at reducing the spread of the virus and being removed from ‘core’ duties to manage state and territory border closures. Indeed, in his evidence to the Commonwealth Government, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement: COVID-19, criminal activity and law enforcement, Scott Weber CEO of the Police Federation of Australia states “we are pretty much at breaking point with regard to staffing levels” (2020, p.40).

In the light of such impact, police agencies are seeking ways to deliver or maintain their service to the public at a reasonable level. One way of attempting to do so is to consider the role of the volunteer in supporting the police. This involves the use of non-warranted, generally

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not uniformed individuals who give up their time freely to assist in whatever capacity they are able to do so. Indeed, the range of opportunities for volunteers is only constrained by legislative measures- for example special powers of arrest for police officers, a lack of understanding of their use, or perhaps cultural resistance to their use. However, they are generally used to support the police in their function, not used to replace ordinarily paid staff.

Research upon the use of police volunteers in Australia appears in its infancy although it is gathering momentum. Therefore, this research aims to explore the use of volunteers by the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF), along with examining just who the volunteers are, what type of training they receive and to obtain their views on their roles in the NSWPF. The purpose of which is to assist managers and policy makers in their day-to-day operational running of the force and to add to the knowledge in this area.

Volunteers in Context

In the UK volunteers are a key feature of social capital, with volunteers increasingly becoming involved in running libraries (Casselden et al 2015) and other local provision of services, including sport (Morgan 2013).

As Cheney and Chui (2010) point out however, at the international level there has been an increasing diversification of police roles and functions within and external to public police agencies sometimes referred to as plural policing or ‘auxiliarisation’ (for example see Rogers, 2016, Dobrin and Wolf 2016, Jones et al 2009, Jones and Newburn 2006), despite the fact that volunteers, in many formats, have worked with the police since their inception. However, whilst the use of volunteers appears to have been historically common, this aspect of policing has received very little attention especially in terms of research, even though it appears to be growing in popularity (Bullock, 2018).

Dobrin (2017) stated that both the police organisation and communities benefit from police volunteerism because people in free societies are best governed when members of the community take active participation in the oversight of the community. Volunteering has therefore been viewed as a potential mechanism for promoting the legitimacy of the police within communities. Here volunteers are seen as bridge or conduit between both parties, i.e. the police and the community it serves.

Van Steden and Mehlbaum (2019), in their study in the Netherlands conclude that volunteers are a useful bridge or contact between the community and police but also point to the fact that volunteers are in a paradoxical position. The need for volunteers must be seen in the wider socio-political context of ‘responsibilising’ citizens, whilst struggling with opposition from unions that see them as threatening jobs. Additionally, training, supervision and management from the police itself required improvement. Despite this, on the level of individual volunteers, they found that most of them choose to undertake voluntary work because they not only wanted to do something worthwhile for the community, but also felt that they improved their personal skills and created a pleasant connection with their regular colleagues.

In Sweden volunteering has been depicted as a resource and a benefit for both the public and the police (Uhnöo and Lofstrand 2018). This has been the case particularly so since the Swedish police reforms of 2015-2017, when they were given a clear political direction to get closer to the citizens and deal with local problems as defined by communities themselves (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention 2016). Voluntary policing initiatives here have gained legitimacy in the eyes of the police and the public and are presented in such a light by the media, and the transfer of responsibility from state to citizens allows for citizen participation and allows for more flexible ways for citizens to influence police operations and

aids accountability (van Steden et al., 2011). In addition, Morgan (2013) points to the social capital through active citizenship that volunteers support provide.

Most studies of volunteers in the USA tend to concentrate upon the sworn volunteer, known sometimes as the police reserve, police auxiliary, or similar names. The fact that there are so many police agencies in the USA (18000 according to the FBI (2014)), makes it difficult to establish just how many volunteers there are actually assisting the police in their duties. Dobrin and Wolf (2016) suggest that 30 -35% of all public safety agencies utilise volunteer officers, whilst an in-depth empirical study by Malega and Garner (2018), suggest that, even though the number of sworn volunteers dropped by approximately 29% between 1999 and 2013, driven by the drop in their use by local police departments, their widespread use supports their importance in American policing. These sworn volunteer officers are utilised on the basis of cost savings, whereby volunteers cover shifts that would otherwise require paid officers to fill. However, this approach, whilst making financial sense, could create hostility with unions that represent full time paid officers. Historically, there has been consistent resistance to the recruitment and use of volunteers by various groups within police organizations. In the UK for example, any inclusion of unsworn or non-employed individuals has been met with scorn and derision fueled by the belief that volunteers would lead to a reduction in the number of paid police officers (Gill and Mawby 1990). It would appear that one of the major tenants of police use of volunteers is that of support rather than to replace officers and paid civilians (DeManno 2013). Indeed, involvement of police and support staff representative bodies in the recruitment stages for volunteers is seen as a way to overcome cultural opposition to the use of such individuals (Rogers, 2016), which now seems to have been accepted with the Police Federation in the England and Wales acknowledging the use of such volunteers (Police Federation 2020)

Nonetheless, volunteers remain cost effective, including utilising ‘special skills’ which reduce the costs for specialist police. For example, West-Midlands police in the UK recently appealed for volunteer digital forensic analysts to sift through CCTV evidence of police incidents, as well as footage of other incidents including indecent images and fatal road accidents (British Broadcasting Corporation 2019).

Volunteers in Australia.

Volunteers within the police family have come to represent the embodiment of active community participation. The notion of volunteering involves citizens taking responsibility and contributing to the governance of the community of which they are part. Indeed, the national peak body for volunteers in Australia describes volunteering as “time willingly given for the common good and without financial gain” (Volunteering Australia 2015a, p.2).

Volunteers are seen as a way of facilitating civic and neighborhood renewal, seen as a form of empowerment as communities take some ownership, creating local solutions to local problems and this in part can be achieved through volunteering in general (Victorian Government 2011). Certainly, volunteering stimulates the development of skills, confidence and greater democratic engagement, helping to encourage community renewal. Active citizenship is presumed to be the heart to civic renewal and social inclusion. Volunteering Australia (2015) suggest that volunteers (44%) were more likely than non-volunteers (15%) to have ever provided a service or activity in their local area, whilst volunteers (82%) were more likely than non-volunteers (55%) to have attended a community event recently. 92% of volunteers expressed the opinion that they were satisfied or very satisfied with their volunteering roles, whilst there were apparent positive feelings regarding wellbeing, happiness and better health through engaging in volunteering work (Volunteering Australia 2015).

In general terms, Volunteering Australia (2015) suggest that in 2010, over 36% of people aged 18 years or over participated in formal volunteering (6.1 million people). 38% of adult women and 34% of adult men volunteered for a variety of roles and different organisations, with 7% of adult volunteers stating they assisted the emergency services, including the police. In 2006 Australian volunteers worked a total of 713 million hours (Volunteer Australia 2015) with male volunteers working an average of 52 hours per year whilst female volunteers worked an average of 60 hours per year.

According to Stott (2011) and Smith (2011), volunteers are typically degree educated, middle aged and of high social class. In Australia, in 2006, the main reason why people volunteered according to Volunteer Australia (2015), was to help others and the community (57%), personal satisfaction (44%), to do something worthwhile (36%), social contact (22%) and to use their skills and experience (16%).

Nonetheless, little is known about police volunteers in Australia with no empirical research having been undertaken. Yet, the concept of volunteering within today's police service is not a new one and indeed has been in use in different countries for a number of years. For example, Special Constables in England and Wales, who are recruited from members of local communities, are unpaid, fully warranted police officers and are the archetypical volunteers in the police in that country whilst in the United States of America (USA), police volunteers have been extensively utilised (see <http://www.policevolunteers.org/> for detailed information regarding these schemes). However, there now appears a scope in many countries, including Australia, for the introduction of and more wide-spread use of different types of volunteer. The police service in the UK for example, has increased the use of volunteers that are unpaid 'civilians', to work within the police organisation (National Police Improvement Agency 2009). These are members of the public who had expressed an interest in working with the police, undertaking various roles and responsibilities within the organisation; however, they are not special constables, have no police powers and are unwarranted. 'Neighbourhood Volunteers' assisted when they could, as many volunteers enjoyed the flexibility of supporting the service and their local community in whatever way they could. Depending on the commitment of the volunteers and the role, whether administrative or involving some sort of community engagement, some volunteers worked from different police stations and others worked on the street engaging with members of the public directly, engaging in community meetings, letter dropping and other operations often working alongside neighbourhood police teams and partner agencies.

Closer to home, the South Australia Police has more than 1,000 registered volunteers in their Police Volunteer Program that engage in a range of non-core policing activities, including providing front counter support, assisting at community events, supporting crime prevention initiatives, helping with the delivery of approved school programs at the Road Safety Centre, and sustaining partnership programmes such as Blue Light and Neighbourhood Watch (South Australia Police 2020). Likewise, the Queensland Police Service operates a Volunteers in Policing program, whereby volunteers complement the roles and responsibilities of paid police officers by assisting victims of crime, liaising with community groups, participating in community-based activities, conducting home security assessments and property identification, and assisting police with customer service and school-based crime prevention projects (Queensland Police Service 2020). The Australian Capital Police also run a Volunteers in Policing program, with volunteers providing front office support, assistance at community events and ceremonies, catering at training exercises and workshops and role playing for police recruit training (Australian Federal Police nd). Finally, the Northern Territory Police Fire and Emergency Services has approximately 300 volunteers within its volunteer units and Emergency Response Groups (ERG) across the Territory, with volunteers

supplementing police, fire and other emergency response professionals by providing vital frontline capabilities and support (Northern Territory Police Fire and Emergency Services 2020). Anecdotal evidence provided to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement suggests that these policing volunteers can “take that pressure off the police officers” and is ‘a really good gateway to improving our policing services generally’ (Close 2020, p.5; Coyne 2020, p.4), however, despite these good intentions it does not appear that these initiatives have been subject to vigorous evaluation to determine their efficacy.

Other jurisdictions such as Western Australia, Victoria and Tasmania have yet to incorporate policing volunteers into the fold. Tasmanian Police Commissioner Darren Hine indicated in 2014 that he was exploring the idea taking on volunteers, in this instance, he referred to former and retired officers being encouraged to return to fill backroom and front counter roles (Bevin 2014). A similar initiative was rolled out by the UK Metropolitan Police in March of this year in response to the COVID-19 outbreak in London, with officers that had left the organisation in the preceding five years being asked to work in a paid or voluntary capacity (British Broadcasting Corporation 2020). The matter of volunteers has been considered more deeply by the Victorian Police, as part of its Blue Paper: A Vision for Victoria Police in 2025, with a proposal that the organisation “consider seriously the use of volunteers in a systematic way as a supplement to existing...staff” (Victoria Police 2014, p.56). This was in light of serious budget constraints, the potential value of volunteers in supplying specialist skills and capacities, allowing paid staff to focus on their areas of expertise, and volunteers bringing deeper knowledge on the needs of citizens and opening the organisation to more diverse groups of people; although this has yet to eventuate (Victoria Police 2014).

In terms of accountability and management, volunteers tend to be loosely regulated, yet at the same time are required to conduct themselves in the highest of standards. Their integration seems to depend largely upon the enthusiasm of key individuals within the criminal justice system. There are undoubted risks associated with involving volunteers in the delivery of public services. Whilst professional staff are under a statutory obligation to provide a contractual service, volunteers have no obligations under any legal contract. Their relationship is fundamentally different, and this of course carries risks as well as benefits. Further, arrangements for recruiting, training, supervision and grievance and disciplinary processes are highly localised. Volunteer management is seen as being more to do with ensuring that volunteers feel welcome, are valued as part of the police service and receive appropriate thanks, encouragement and praise. Training of volunteers may be limited, reflecting issues relating to resources and available time. Vetting seen as a precautionary measure – a basic insight into the character of potential volunteers- and seen as a safeguard for police and sometimes used as an excuse for police not to involve volunteers. Whilst security in this area is vital, if measures are also too onerous this may prevent those who have a lot to offer from volunteering.

The NSWPF Volunteer Program.

The *Police Service (Volunteer Police) Amendment Act 1992* was an Act of the Parliament of New South Wales, Australia, establishing a trial of volunteer police officers in the New South Wales Police Service. Introduced to the Parliament by the Liberal Government, the Act was strongly opposed by the Labour Opposition and the New South Wales Police Association. Supporters of the Act - members of the Liberals and the Democrats argued that volunteer police would build upon the community policing practices implemented by the Government, would augment police in the event of an emergency, and would allow members of the public to contribute to a cause which they felt strongly about. Elements of this debate can be seen below:

“Over recent years, the New South Wales Police Service has adopted community-based policing as its primary operational strategy. The proposed introduction of volunteers in policing is a logical extension of community-based policing, the tradition of volunteer service to the community is a particularly strong one in Australia. However, the concept of using volunteers in policing is new to Australia”.^[2]

The Hon. Edward Pickering MLC, NSW Parliamentary Hansard

“Volunteer involvement engenders a sense of community, a connection between paid workers and the ordinary public with both committed to a common purpose. Furthermore, the experience of volunteers and their different skills enhance the quality of the service.”^[4]

The Hon. Elisabeth Kirkby MLC, NSW Parliamentary Hansard

The Labour Opposition, however, backed by the principal unions in the Police Service - the New South Wales Police Association, the Commissioned Police Officers Association of New South Wales, and the Public Service Association - was opposed to the Act. Arguments against the Act revolved around concerns that police volunteers would not be sufficiently trained, experienced or equipped for police work, and that the Government intended on tricking the public into thinking there were more police officers on the streets than was actually the case. Indeed, concerns were raised that the legislation should be named ‘the hobby bobby legislation’ with the public requiring and deserving an accountable, trained and professional police service as opposed to well-intentioned amateurs (Dyer 1992).

In 1995, the NSWPF introduced a scheme called Volunteers in Policing (VIPs), which allows community members to assist police by performing certain *non-core* police duties. Such duties are limited to community engagement and basic administrative tasks, with no law enforcement responsibilities or powers granted to volunteers. One of the ideas behind this was to ensure volunteers were an integral part of a police team and through their participation, allow the police to concentrate on core duties which included tackling crime problems. There have been some critiques of the program however, with it being reported that a Public Service Association (NSW public sector union) staff survey identified VIP participants being used to ‘plug staffing holes’ and engage in tasks they are not trained for; such as following up on victims of crime, taking minutes of confidential meetings, shredding sensitive documents, and cataloging child pornography and photographs of criminals (Sydney Morning Herald 2007), which was denied by NSWPF.

Currently the NSWPF has 21,080 employees consisting of 17,111 police officers and 3969 administrative officers (NSW Government 2019a). However, 1500 new permanent positions have been committed over a four-year period, following an announcement by NSW Premier Gladys Berejiklian for more police to “keep our community safe” (Berejiklian 2018, p.1). This influx provides NSWPF with the capacity to expand their resources, nonetheless, challenges remain. Police services are expected to respond to increasingly complex current and future challenges as has been demonstrated, and having the right people in the right places at the right time is paramount for the efficient and effective delivery of policing services to satisfy these growing demands (Flanagan 2008). This position is reflected in the New South Wales Police Force Statement of Strategic Intent 2019, with a key pillar of the strategy to “facilitate flexible workforce allocation and deployment to meet demand and community need” (2019,

p.2). Furthermore, to collaborate with communities across NSW and “promote and capitalise on workforce diversity” (NSW Government 2019, p.2). Factors that volunteers in policing have been said to address.

Becoming a Volunteer in Policing

The current process of becoming a volunteer in NSWPF contains certain criteria. An applicant for the role of volunteer must:

- be of good health and over 18 years of age;
- be an Australian citizen or have permanent resident status;
- possess satisfactory communication skills;
- have proven involvement in the community;
- undergo a police records check and fingerprinting;

(see https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/recruitment_links/volunteer_in_policing)

NSWPF state that all volunteers receive specialist training and support for a diverse range of duties. This training is normally delivered at the local Police Area Command (PAC) and the content of the training is subject to the role requirements and needs specified by the relevant Command. This includes specialist units who utilise specific skills of volunteers.

In order for the public and other police employees to determine an individual is a volunteer, volunteers in the VIP program are provided a shirt, vest or jumper and cap with the words “Volunteers In policing” embodied in blue cotton. A nametag is worn on the right side of the chest and photographic identification clipped to the clothing.

In general, volunteers work with the NSWPF in the following duties:

- assist police with victim support and customer service;
- support witnesses attending court and during the court process;
- perform community liaison functions such as senior citizens meeting and community safety committees;
- participate in community policing initiatives such as safety audits and engraving programs;
- assist during times of disaster or emergency;
- maintain local registers including citizens at risk and key holder registers;
- maintain a scrapbook of police related newspaper clippings;
- maintain the public noticeboard in the foyer;
- assist with school fetes and youth programs;
- promote crime prevention initiatives by distributing crime prevention materials at shopping centers, schools, car parks and home addresses;
- perform administrative tasks such as minute taking, shredding, filing, photocopying and packing;
- assist Protocol Officer at medal ceremonies.

METHODOLOGY

Consideration of obtaining the views of volunteers across the whole of the New South Wales (NSW) state meant that cost was a major factor. Whilst interviews and semi-structured interviews can produce much rich qualitative data, the cost of travelling across such a large geographical area was prohibitive. Consequently, it was decided to conduct this research through the use of an electronic survey.

However, there remained the question of confidentiality and access to the volunteers. NSWPF utilise a central office that administers the use of volunteers. Working with staff at the office, the following method of delivering the survey was devised:

1. The survey questions were prepared in collaboration with NSWPF in order to ensure that protocol was observed and the questions produce meaningful results for the organisation as well as for academic purposes.
2. Once constructed the survey was produce electronically using the Survey Monkey application, and an email with a link to the survey was sent to the volunteers' administration.
3. They then circulated the survey link to all volunteers in NSWPF with a request that they complete it.
4. The survey link was left open for five weeks in order to capture as much data as possible.
5. At the conclusion of the time limit the link was de-established and the data analysed.


The research method and the research itself was passed by the Charles Sturt University Ethics Committee, and was agreed in writing by NSWPF management who were involved in the process from the beginning. At the time of the survey 256 volunteers were engaged in the NSWPF Volunteers in Policing (VIPs) program. A total of 81 NSWPF VIPs participated in the survey meaning the results are generalisable to all NSWPF VIPs.

RESULTS

The survey results provide baseline data on volunteers in the NSWPF, by examining just who the volunteers are, what type of training they receive and to obtain their views on their roles in the NSWPF. This is in order to assist managers and policy makers in their day to day operational running of the force and will add to the knowledge of policing volunteers in Australia.

First, it is useful to understand the demographics of those people who volunteer for assisting the police in their duties. As previously mentioned, volunteers in general are typically degree educated, middle aged and of high social class. Furthermore, individual background characteristics such as race and formal educational attainment are commonly identified as likely predictors of volunteer engagement, although age is the most significant predictor of citizen engagement due to an association between age and time available for volunteering (Ren et al 2006). Research suggests that volunteers in the main comprise of the mature sections of society who have completed their active working lives but remain active and feel a sense of mission in the sense of giving something back to the community


Graph 1, below, illustrates the age profile of those volunteers who completed this survey.



Graph 1: Age profile of respondents.

Clearly, those who took part in this survey were overwhelmingly the more mature section of society, with 93% stating they were over 60 years of age. This aspect of the research is important because age may influence volunteers' perceptions of community, police and of crime in general. Additionally, it may also influence a preference for certain types of tasks available. 72% of all respondents described themselves as retired with the remaining stating they were employed, or engaged in other activities.


Volunteers were also asked to indicate their gender if they wished to do so. The results can be seen in Graph 2 below.



Graph 2: Gender of respondents

Whilst the male volunteers comprise 39% of respondents, some 61% identified themselves as female. This is rather higher than the national average according to Volunteering Australia who suggest that nationally 38% of females volunteered for a variety of roles, whilst 20% stated they had a disability, long term illness or health condition.


Additionally, the volunteers were asked to self-identify their ethnicity. Graph 3, below, illustrates the results.



Graph 3: Ethnicity of respondents

The overwhelming number of volunteers who responded (94%) identified themselves as white or Caucasian, while other ethnicities comprised much smaller numbers. Whereas, the new NSWPF Diversity and Inclusion Strategy Attract 2020-2023 suggests that reflecting the diversity of the community means being more aligned with their needs, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the force. Consequently, a key aim is to “recruit, develop, promote and retain a workforce that is representative of the NSW community” (New South Wales Government 2020, p.15).


All of the volunteers were asked what specific role they were engaged in with the police from the following selection; Administration, Analysis, Community events, Non community events (such as police barbeques), Victim follow up and surveys, or Other (please specify), Graph 4, below, illustrates their answers.



Graph 4: Volunteer roles

It would appear that most of the volunteers in this survey are utilised in administration and community events whilst some are used for contact directly with victims of crime in follow up capacity. Those that selected ‘other’ cited a combination of these roles. It would also appear obvious that volunteers are committed to assisting the police and the community in the work that they do. Indeed, most (77%) respondents volunteered up to 10 hours per week, and the remainder up to 20 hours (33%).

However, even volunteers have a certain shelf life, especially if some are elderly and retired. Consequently, volunteers were asked to indicate how long they expected to continue in their volunteering role with the police. Graph 5, below, shows the responses.




Graph 5: Expectations of continuing to volunteer.

The data provided shows a solid commitment by the majority of current volunteers to continue in this activity. However, when combined, some 29% of current volunteers may stop this activity within 3 years.

Recruitment and Training


It is important to examine the recruitment process involved for volunteers in NSWPF and the initial training they received to assimilate them into the organisation. Firstly, volunteers were asked how they found out about the role in the first instance. Graph 6, below, illustrates their answers.



Graph 6: Finding out about Police Volunteers

The results in the graph above illustrate that the use of social media appears not to play such a significant part in recruiting volunteers. This may in part, explain the age profile of the respondents in this survey, and may also explain perhaps the lack of younger people actually volunteering. More established communication routes such as newspapers, word of mouth and just speaking to the police appear to be significant.


The volunteers were provided with a series of statements regarding the process of recruitment and asked to agree, disagree or provide no comment. Graph 7, below, shows the response to the statement concerning their process of recruitment, and how well they felt their individual process of recruitment went for them.



Graph 7: Response to statement that the recruitment process went well

The vast majority agreed that the process went well. Those who stated it did not go so well cited lack of contact and communication as being one of the major problems.

Volunteers were also asked to comment upon the following question concerning whether their duties and the police expectations of them were clearly explained during the application process. This is illustrated below in Graph 8.




Graph 8: Duties and expectations explained

The majority of individuals stated they were told about their duties and expectations were clearly explained during the application. This is important so that individuals understand where they fit into the organisation, and helps to reduce abstractions later on in the process.

Volunteers were also asked about their experiences of being trained. Currently it would appear that training for volunteers is decentralised and delivered by staff in the PAC. It is suggested that this approach ensures the volunteers are aware of local issues and methods of policing, and is apparently delivered in a multi approach method, some being face to face, some being on-line training etc.


Respondents were asked if they had received training when they started their volunteering role. Their answers are seen below in Graph 9.



Graph 9: Training received when starting their role

Whilst 72% stated they had received training when starting their role a disappointing number stated they had not (26%) This of course would tend to undermine the value of the individual and their sense of worth to the organisation. Investment in staff, whether volunteer or other, is important. However, it may be the case that the demands on PAC training facilitators is such that they have to prioritise other areas.


For those who did receive training, the statement concerning having more practical sessions was asked. Their response is shown in the following graph.



Graph 10: Response to having more sessions that are practical

What is interesting here is that 20% of respondents offered no opinion which perhaps indicates a lack of knowledge concerning how their role fits into the general world of policing. Despite that, 65% of respondents suggested that they would have liked to have more practical sessions in their training.

In part perhaps this would explain the responses to the statement that the training delivery worked well for the volunteer as can be seen in Graph 11, below.




Graph 11: Response to whether the training delivery worked well for the volunteer

Whilst 65% stated the training delivery worked well for them, 32% suggested it did not work well for them. Reasons for this were reported as being the method of delivery itself- on-line- and not one to one, was not as effective as it could have been, and that some of the training was generic, and not focused on the specific needs of the individual volunteer.

Work Experiences

Work experiences are very important as they help to determine our world view of the agency we work for and also how we explain our activities to others. This is especially so with the police organisation which it is reported can have a closed occupational culture when it comes to those regarded as 'outsiders' (see Bowling et al 2019 for example) Therefore, it was considered important to seek the perceptions of those who work alongside the police as unsworn volunteers, particularly as volunteers are often seen as a bridge between the police and the community.

Volunteers were provided with a series of statements and asked whether they agreed or not. Graph 12, below, illustrates the responses to the statement that their efforts as a volunteer were well recognised in the workplace.




Graph 12: Volunteer recognition

Clearly the vast majority (91%) state they felt their efforts were well recognised by those working around them with only 9% disagreeing with this statement. Similarly, volunteers were presented with a statement that volunteers felt appreciated by the police for their contribution. On this occasion some 90% agreed with this statement whilst 10% disagreed with it, and 97% agreed with the statement that they felt they were treated with respect as a volunteer in the workplace.

Overall, it would appear that the day-to-day experience of working within the police organisation for the volunteer is one where they are treated fairly, with respect and feel appreciated by others. This is corroborated by the fact that 95% of volunteers in this survey felt that the service was sufficiently flexible in terms of balancing other demands on their time, whilst 97% felt the organisation was considerate of their individual needs.

One of the main aspects of utilising volunteers appears to be the fact that they can bring with them different skill sets and world views that will enhance the police organisation. It was important therefore to establish if this was the case. Graph 13, below, illustrates volunteer response to the statement that the police understand the skills and experience brought by the volunteer.



Graph 13: Understanding volunteer skills and experience

For the first time we see the agreed responses drop below the 90% mark, albeit that 85% agreed that their skills were understood and appreciated by the police. 15% disagreed with this statement which suggests there is an undercurrent of non-appreciation that may need addressing.

CONCLUSION

Volunteers suggest that overall, they are well looked after and managed in the workplace. There appears to be a clear commitment on behalf of the current group of volunteers to remain doing so. However, it would appear that there will be a reduction in the number of volunteers for policing activities in the next three years. This, coupled with an increased need for volunteers in other areas of public service, means the police need to be conscious of introducing a strategy to maintain their volunteering numbers for the pool available. Unsurprisingly, the majority of volunteers are white, over 60, retired and mainly women in this survey. This follows the pattern of the general picture of volunteering in Australia, as reported by Volunteering Australia. Therefore, any strategy must involve a greater drive for younger and more diverse members of the public to come forward to volunteer for working with the police.

The localised nature of training of volunteers is a familiar pattern across the world, with training of volunteers being limited reflecting issues of resources and available time. However, if future demands upon policing mean an increase in reliance upon volunteers then there has to be some form of investment to ensure volunteers are adequately trained and efficient in their work, as well as understanding their wider expectations within the whole of the police organisation.

A range of opportunities are already in place for diverting resource capacity, including the use of volunteers in various Australian jurisdictions, Special Constables in NSW and Protective Services Officers in Victoria, although the latter are paid positions. Calls have also been made for a national police reservist force based on the Australian Defence Force Reserves, with an Australian model of training proposed given the disparate approach across

jurisdictions. Indeed, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have already established an AFP Reserve to support their operational preparedness, which commenced on 16 April 2020 (Australian Federal Police 2020). This will initially encompass retired and former employees, comprising of almost 50 members currently and an expectation of 200 to be in place by December 2020 (AFP 2020). What is clear is that these options are increasingly being debated, such that police services can remain agile in times of uncertainty and continue to offer effective services despite funding constraints.

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Serial Homicide in Australia, 1820-2020

Amber McKinley¹ and Wayne Petherick

ABSTRACT

Serial homicide attracts significant attention from the media, entertainment industries, the criminal justice system, and related disciplines even though it accounts for less than 1% of all homicides in Australia. Despite this interest, there is a shortage of research on serial murder specifically applicable to Australia. This study provides an overview of Australian serial homicide, reporting on characteristics related to the victims, perpetrators, and features of the crime. The sample is the largest ever examined in Australia and consists of 71 serial homicides, with 317 victims, committed by 82 perpetrators where each committed at least two homicides. By examining the Australian National Homicide Monitoring Program, the Radford and Florida Gulf Coast University Serial Killer Database, court transcripts, textbooks, and media reports, the authors tabulated offence variables including the number of victims, number of offenders, and motive.

Key Words: Australia, Serial homicide, Serial killers, Victims, Solved homicides.

INTRODUCTION

Serial homicide in Australia is rare and consequently has attracted minimal research. The few studies that have been completed document information such as perpetrator characteristics, modus operandi, motivation, signature behaviours, and details of the victims' cause of death. Despite the relative dearth of research on the subject, perhaps owing to the low base rate, serial murder has featured as a type of homicide in Australia's history and as such is important to examine. To date studies have reported lower base rates than those found in this investigation, and thus this paper constitutes the most thorough and comprehensive review of Australian serial homicides from 1820-2020, providing an up-to-date overview of the topic and extending upon previous studies (Mouzos & West, 2007; Pinto & Wilson, 1990). The National Homicide Monitoring Program provided data from 1989-2016 and additional data was accessed through the Radford and Florida Gulf Coast University Serial Killer Database, court records via the Australian Legal Information Institute (AustLii), relevant media and other written works.

DEFINING SERIAL HOMICIDE

According to Kraemer, Lord and Heilbrun (2004), "most definitions of serial homicide include three elements: the number of victims, time [between incidents], and motivation" (p. 326). Although perhaps true in the past, modern definitions typically only cover two features: the number of victims and time between incidents. According to most authors, the minimum number of victims for a perpetrator to be classified as a serial murderer is two, and this is the victim count now accepted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (Morton & Hills, 2005). Herein serial homicide is defined as "the killing of two or more victims by the same offender(s); where the offences have been reliably linked; where there is a non-offending period between offences; and the motive for these offences is personal, rather than corporate, organisational, or institutional in nature" (Petherick, Bose, McKinley & Skrapek, in press).

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VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS OF SERIAL HOMICIDE

Mouzos and West (2007) found that between July 1989 and June 2006 most Australian serial homicide victims were female ($n = 33$, 63%), Caucasian (where race was known), and strangers to their perpetrators (where relationship was known; $n = 25$, 51%). Numbers and percentages have been provided in all places where they were provided by the author. They also found that the mean age of serial homicide victims was 31.5 years, supporting an earlier study by Pinto and Wilson (1990) finding that between July 1900 and June 1990 most Australian serial homicide victims were female (where gender was known; $n = 40/64$, 63%). Pinto and Wilson discovered 17 incidents in total, five of which were unsolved at time of publication.

Regarding victim gender, race, and relationship to perpetrator, Australian findings support those conducted in the United States, Italy, Germany, and England (Miller, 2014; Pakkanen et al., 2015; Soroichinski & Salfati, 2010: female victims: 52-88%, Caucasian victims: 53-80%, stranger victims: 54-90%). Some authors provided a more general response (e.g., stated that most victims were female). However, they only partially support the findings of a South African study (Salfati et al., 2015: female victims: 65%, stranger victims: 73%; Caucasian victims: 8%) likely because, unlike the populations of the other countries mentioned, most of South Africa's population is black.

Regarding the average age of victims, Mouzos and West's (2007) findings are similar to those of overseas research, which report mean ages from 25-35 years (Miller, 2014; Pakkanen et al., 2015; Salfati et al., 2015; Soroichinski & Salfati, 2010). Many of these studies also reported that most victims were young and/or middle-aged adults (Miller, 2014; Pakkanen et al., 2015; Salfati et al., 2015).

PERPETRATOR CHARACTERISTICS OF SERIAL HOMICIDE

Mouzos and West (2007) found that most serial killers were male ($n = 12/13$, 92%), acting alone ($n = 9/13$, 69%), and unemployed when apprehended (where employment status was known; number and percentage not provided). These findings generally align with those from the earlier study by Pinto and Wilson (1990), which found that most serial killers were male ($n = 12/15$, 80%) and employed when apprehended (where status was known; $n = 11/12$, 92%). A problem discovered in this study is that two separate sets of variables are used to analyse victims and offenders and they do not provide enough points of commonality for comparison.

Regarding serial killer gender and number, Australian findings support those of overseas studies (Fox & Levin, 2015; Salfati et al., 2015; Soroichinski & Salfati, 2010: male: 83-100%, acting alone: 72%). Regarding perpetrator employment, however, the level of support is less clear, with all overseas studies finding that most serial killers were employed at the time of the homicides (53-67%) (Salfati et al., 2015). Whether all these perpetrators were still employed when apprehended is unknown.

Other perpetrator characteristics examined in the overseas literature include intelligence, race, marital status, criminal history, and age. Aamodt et al. (2007) found that most serial killers were moderately intelligent (IQ of 90-109; 68%) and Caucasian (74%). Additionally, Salfati and Bateman (2005) found that most serial killers were single at the time of the homicides (70%) and had a previous criminal history (78%). They also found that most serial killers in their sample were young or middle-aged adults at time of first offence (mean_{age} = 32) and arrest (mean_{age} = 33). These findings support the findings of other overseas studies (Godwin, 2008; Harbort & Mokros, 2001; Hickey, 2009; Kraemer et al., 2004; Pakhomou, 2004; Salfati & Bateman, 2005; Salfati et al., 2015; Snook et al., 2005; Walsh, 2005: moderately intelligent: 62-68%, Caucasian: 61-82%, single: 57-70%, previous criminal history: 81-89%, mean_{age} at first homicide: 28-29, mean_{age} at arrest: 30-33). The partial exception is a study by Salfati et al. (2015), which found that most serial killers were black (67%).

Critically, previous research has not examined the type of employment of serial killers, which may be vital in either facilitating their modus operandi or influencing their ‘hunting’ ‘dumping’ or ‘killing’ ground (for example, blue-collar labourers, white-collar professionals, related to the business of security or law enforcement, etc.). Moreover, previous research has discussed levels of education and offenders’ intelligence, yet very little is demonstrated regarding their actual education (Harbort & Mokros, 2001; Winerman, 2004). A question for future consideration is whether serial killers have their intelligence fostered through formal education or whether they are naturally intelligent yet poorly educated, or perhaps “street smart” as opposed to what is typically classified as intelligent.

INCIDENT CHARACTERISTICS OF SERIAL HOMICIDE

Mouzos and West (2007) found that most serial homicides involved a sexual element ($n = 6/11$, 55%) where information was known. This included evidence that one or more victims were sexually assaulted, or where crime scene evidence identified things such as removal of underwear, exposure of genitals, removal of genitals, or stabbing the genital region. They also discovered victims being killed with a knife (most common method; $n = 5/9$, 56%) or via strangulation (second most common; $n = 3/9$, 27%), with victims being abducted from an outdoor location. They also found that serial homicides, where motive/intent was known (10/11 cases), were committed for financial gain ($n = 3/10$, 30%; 6/13 perpetrators), due to hatred ($n = 3/10$, 30%; 6/13 perpetrators), or for psychosexual reasons ($n = 3/10$, 30%; 3/13 perpetrators). Similarly, Pinto and Wilson (1990) found that serial homicides where the method of killing was known (16/17 cases) involved the use of a knife (second most common; $n = 4/16$; 25%) or strangulation (most common method; $n = 9/16$; 56%). They also found that most victims, where the method of death was known (97/101 victims), were killed via neglect/starvation (most common method; $n = 37/97$, 38%) or strangulation (second most common; $n = \sim 30/97$, $\sim 31\%$).

Regarding the presence of a sexual element, Mouzos and West’s (2007) findings contrast with those of Jenkins (1992; 11/30 series; 37%). Furthermore, they cannot be directly

compared to the findings of other overseas studies due to measurement differences [i.e., Mouzos and West (2007) used number of series, while other studies used number of victims]. These studies found that most serial homicide victims' deaths involved a sexual element (Kraemer et al., 2004: at least 66%; Salfati & Bateman, 2005: at least 61%; Salfati et al., 2015: 66%). Regarding motive, as above, Mouzos and West's (2007) findings cannot be directly compared to the findings from non-Australian studies due to measurement differences.

Regarding the method of killing, Pinto and Wilson's (1990) findings contrast to those from overseas research which have consistently found firearms (Fox & Levin, 2015: 39%; Salfati et al., 2015: 30%; Santtila et al., 2008: 47%) or strangulation (Harbort & Mokros, 2001: 33%; Sorochinski & Salfati, 2010: 49%+) to be the most common method of killing, most likely a result of differential access to firearms comparative to Australia. They have also found blunt instruments (Salfati et al., 2015: 28%), firearms (Harbort & Mokros, 2001: 24%), sharp objects/knives (Santtila et al., 2008: 29%; Sorochinski & Salfati, 2010: 19%+), or strangulation (Fox & Levin, 2015: 39%) to be the second most common. No known overseas studies have examined abduction site. Regarding other incident characteristics, Salfati et al. (2015) found that most victims were killed outside (78%). Similarly, Santtila et al. (2008) found that most serial homicide victims were found at the scene of the murder (74%) and were found outdoors (64%). This supports findings from other overseas studies (Pakkanen et al., 2015; Salfati & Bateman, 2005; Sorochinski & Salfati, 2010).

METHODOLOGY

Aim

This study aimed to identify the incidence of serial homicide in Australia from 1 January 1820 to 31 January 2020 using only solved cases. The authors sought to identify the common characteristics of Australian serial homicide victims, perpetrators, and incidents. The study analysed all recorded solved serial homicides by date, the number of victims and perpetrators involved, demographics, the recorded motivation, cause of death and, whether there was a sexual element involved.

Case Identification

Solved serial homicide cases were identified using the Aamodt Radford/FGCU Serial Killer Database (2018). A review of extant Australian peer-reviewed literature on serial homicides (Pinto & Wilson, 1990; Mouzos & West, 2007) was conducted, as was a review of the National Homicide Monitoring Program (NHMP) annual reports from 1989-2016. Multiple online engines/databases, such as Google (including Google Scholar, Google Books and Google News Archive) and Trove (the Australian National Library's database aggregator) were also used.

Inclusion Criteria

Solved serial homicide cases were considered eligible for inclusion in the study if they met the following criteria:

- (a) The first murder in the series occurred after 1 January 1820.
- (b) The last murder in the series occurred before 31 January 2020.
- (c) The perpetrator(s) killed at least two victims in separate incidents.

- (d) At least two reliable sources mentioning the case could be located (e.g., court documents, historical documents, peer-reviewed journal articles, or NHMP annual reports).

Case Details

Once the cases were identified, the following information was compiled for each solved serial homicide. The year of perpetrator's first and last known murder, total number of perpetrators, gender of perpetrator(s), age of perpetrator(s) at time of first offence, racial appearance of perpetrator(s), total number of victims, gender of victims, age of victims at time of death, race of victims, motive of perpetrator, method(s) of killing used, whether or not a sexual element was present, and any victim vulnerabilities. (When the age of the victim or perpetrator was unavailable, their birth date was recorded along with the date they were killed or the date of their first and last offence.)

The initial intention was to collect data on all victim, perpetrator, and incident characteristics previously examined in the literature. However, preliminary searches indicated that information on some variables (e.g., perpetrator employment and marital status) was unavailable, so these were excluded from the analysis.

Collection Process

Information relating to the variables was collected from the following sources:

- a) The first author (AM) was granted access to the Radford and Florida Gulf Coast University Serial Killer Database;
- b) Court documents/transcripts available through the Australian Legal Information Institute (austlii.edu.au);
- c) Peer-reviewed journal articles by Pinto and Wilson (1990) and Mouzos and West (2007);
- d) Open source books examining Australian serial homicide (e.g., Kidd, 2001, 2011; Morton & Lobez, 2009); and
- e) Newspaper articles found through Trove, Google, and the Google News Archive.

Information was only used when found in at least two sources, except for data found in court documents. When information was conflicting (e.g., two sources stated that the victim was 23 and three stated that they were 27), the decision on what piece of information to retain (or whether to retain both) was made based on the reliability of the sources and/or the number of sources that reported each piece of data.

Data Analysis

The data was analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics (Version 25) for Windows 10. Frequencies and descriptive statistics were generated for all variables. Measures of central tendency, standard deviations (SDs), minimums, and maximums were calculated for several variables, including perpetrator age (time of first and last offence) and victim age (time of death).

RESULTS

Solved Serial Homicide Series

Incidence

Seventy-one solved serial homicide series involving 317 victims and 82 perpetrators were identified in total. The mean number of victims killed in a series was 4.46 ($SD = 4.52$, $median = 4.69$, $range = 35$, minimum = 2, maximum = 37), while the mean duration of a series was 5.56 years ($SD = 7.77$, $median = 5.75$, $range = 39$, minimum = 1, maximum = 40). As exact dates for each homicide were not provided in the data, the number of years an offender was active is an approximate range based on the most accurate information for first and last offences.

The higher peaks occurring in 1890-1899 and 1900-1909 (Figure 1) relate to the deaths of 52 children at the hands of baby farmers (Sarah and John Makin; Alice Mitchell, respectively) as well as the poisoning of siblings (Martha Needle). During 1910-1919 there were no records of any serial murders, possibly due to Australia's involvement in World War 1 (1914-1918), when the men who may have killed in Australia were deployed elsewhere and Australian police were engaged in other activities and therefore investigations or records were not given priority.




Figure 1: Number of Australian solved serial homicide victims by decade

From 1960-1999, Australia experienced significant social changes, such as the Vietnam War, the introduction of female contraception, the 'free-love' movement and the ability of large numbers of people to travel by commercial flights. Drugs also had a significant impact on Australian society.

More recently, from 2010-2019, technology, mobile phones, social media and greater acceptance of prostitution and deviant sexual activities available live online (where participants in these acts do not even have to physically meet) allows potential sexual perpetrators to satisfy their needs without the non-consensual elements of abduction and rape previously seen.

Victim Characteristics

Serial offenders killed only females in 23 offences (32.4%), both males and females were victimised at the same rate as females only ($n = 23$, 32.4%), with only males being the victim in 17 cases (23.9%). Males and unknown were victims in two cases (2.8%), and females and unknown were victims in one case (1.4%). The victim's sex was unknown in five cases (7.8%). The average number of victims killed was 4.73 ($SD = 4.71$, range = 35, minimum = 2, maximum = 37).

Victims were mostly Caucasian ($n = 47$, 66.2%), though a large percentage of the victim race information was unknown ($n = 16$, 22.5%). Mixed race victims were recorded in seven of the offences (9.9%), while Indigenous offenders were only represented in one case (1.4%). Victims were mostly adults ($n = 147$, 46.4%), followed by babies ($n = 50$, 15.7%), then children and teenagers (both $n = 28$, 8.8%). Further descriptive statistics for age will be less meaningful because victim age was unknown in many cases ($n = 64$, 20.2%).

The number of victims killed by each murderer or group was significantly weighted at the lower victim count, with higher victim counts being less common. Two victims, the minimum victim count to be considered a serial offence, were killed in 21 of the cases. Three victims were killed in 15 cases, four victims in 13 cases, five victims in 11 cases. Seven victims were murdered in three cases and nine in two cases. Six, eight, 10, 11, 12, and 13 victims were murdered in one case each.

Perpetrator Characteristics

The vast majority of serial homicide perpetrators were male ($n = 56$, 78.9%), with eight female offenders (11.3%). Multiple male offenders feature in four cases (5.6%), male and females in two cases (2.8%), and multiple males and females in only one case (1.4%). Solo offenders were the most prevalent ($n = 63$, 88.77%), with two offenders in six cases (8.5%), and three and four offenders in one case each (1.4%). The age of first offence was as low as 16 years and as high as 68 years, and the age at last offence was as low as 16 years and as high as 77 years.

As with victims, most offenders were Caucasian ($n = 66$, 93%), with two Indigenous offenders (2.8%), one European (1.4%), one Lebanese (1.4%) and one of unknown race (1.4%). The number of years active was recorded for 68 of the offence series with this information missing in three cases. Most offenders were active for one year or less ($n = 24$, 35.3%), followed by two years ($n = 12$, 16.9%), three years in seven of the cases, four years and 11 years in four cases, five years in three cases, eight, 10, and 27 years in four cases each (5.6%), and six, seven, nine, 13, 16, 25, 28, and 40 years in one case each (1.4% for each; $M = 5.56$ years, $SD = 7.77$, range = 39, minimum = 1, maximum = 40).

Incident Characteristics

Methods of Killing

As expected, there was significant variability in killing methods. Some methods occurred infrequently – neglect, vehicular, drugging, and decapitation occurred only once each (1.4%). Punching occurred in three cases (4%) and drowning in two cases (2.8%). Other

methods were more prevalent. Sharp force was the most common (n = 31, 43.6%), followed by blunt force (n = 29, 40.8%), strangulation (n = 21, 29.5%), shooting (n = 198, 25.4%), smothering (n = 7, 9.9%), and poisoning (n = 5, 7%).

Sexual Element and Motivation

Despite previous assertions that serial murderers are regularly sexual offenders (Miller, 2014; Seltzer, 2013) the number of cases within this data set with and without sexual elements were relatively balanced, however, in six cases (8.5%), the sexual element was unknown. There were 28 cases without a sexual element and 37 cases with (39.4% and 52.1% respectively). A sexual element was recorded when there was evidence that one or more victims were sexually assaulted, or there were sexual overtones within the crime scene (e.g., genitals were exposed or stabbed).

Further descriptive statistics for motive may not be particularly instructive as individual offences may have multiple motives or multiple motives over multiple offences. Because of this, only frequencies and percentages are presented. It should also be noted that motivation is notoriously difficult to infer, and this was possibly reflected in the current data set with 18 of the 64 cases (25.3%) reporting an unknown motive. Anger was the most common motive after unknown, found in 19 cases (26.7%), followed by profit (n = 15, 21.1%), psychosexual motivation (n = 13, 18.3%), then pleasure (n = 10, 14.1%). Following these were the less common motives of crime concealment (n = 5, 7%), personal gain (n = 5, 9.7%), thrill (n = 4, 5.6%), theft, jealousy, and revenge in two cases each (2.8%), and power motive in one case (2.4%).

DISCUSSION

The data did not reveal any discernible patterns between the number of victims, the number of offenders, and motives. One series with four motives included five victims for one offender, while another with two motives included 11 victims for three offenders. In the case with the highest victim count (n = 37) the motive was listed as unknown for all victims, though this is likely due to the deaths occurring between 1822-1906. Determining the motive during this time may not have been particularly important for police or the courts, or the psychological features of motive may have been poorly understood. Because of large absence of this data, no further analysis of the link between number of victims, offenders, and motives was undertaken.

Results demonstrate more females than males and more strangers than intimate partners and acquaintances have been victim to Australian serial killers during the past 200 years, and this finding is consistent with other research where females are targeted more than males. Specifically, males are more likely to target females, and females are more likely to target familiars usually in so called “carer” crimes such as health care workers (Harrison, Hughes & Gott, 2019). This was also found in the current study. Results for the age of victims was as expected, with a caveat, as it was only recorded for 188 out of 317 victims (59% of the sample), thus there is a large amount of missing data (one-third). For the 59% of cases where age was available, there were 30 victims under 10 years, 31 between 10-18 years, 62 between 18-30

years, 20 between 30-40 years, and 45 over 40 years. For the 188 victims with a known age, the average age was 26.40 years.

Many of the cases involving missing data occurred early in the history of the sample, perhaps as expected. For example, the case of Alice Mitchell, who killed 37 victims, was simply discussed in the legal transcripts using language of the time as involving the murder of infants. There was no specific mention of age for any of the victims in any of the available documents. Modern criminal justice systems (investigations and courts) are much more data driven now than at previous times and more information regarding cases is likely required in order to secure a conviction in modern times. Thus, earlier historical data is less feature rich.

Perpetrators of serial homicide had a mean age of 30.37 years at the time of their first offence ($n = 60$). However, the mean age at first offence was only calculated for those cases with one offender, inclusive of both male and female offenders, and thus cases involving multiple offenders were excluded so as not to skew the data. As such, caution should be exercised before drawing any conclusions about the age of serial murderers. The expectation that most serial killers would be male, Caucasian and acting alone, was supported. While these data show that the average age of Australian serial murderers is general the same as their international counterparts, judicious interpretation of the missing information is warranted.

The results demonstrated that most victims were killed by sharp or blunt force ($n=31$ and 29 respectively), which generally comports to the other Australian research, though differs slightly from the international research where firearms play more of a role. This is likely explained by the differential access to firearms in Australia relative to other countries, especially for those offences after 1997 following the Port Arthur incident. Perpetrators commonly targeted victims because they were vulnerable due to age, gender, relationship to the perpetrator or employment, which is again in line with previous literature (Hickey, 2009). Perpetrators appeared able to focus on specific factors that made victims susceptible to initial targeting, such as being children in the perpetrator's care, being alone in public spaces, or hitchhiking/backpacking and accepted a lift from the perpetrator.

As this is the first research of its scale and type in Australia, this paper will naturally raise more questions than it answers. This study should be used as a starting point from which to base future research to identify trends and issues related to serial homicide. New topics such as victim targeting and the abduction site, perpetrators' cooling-off periods (such as whether perpetrators actually cool-off), missing persons as victims of serial killers, and motivations should be considered.

Conclusion

Historically, due to the small number of Australian victims, this field of research has been under-studied (Pinto & Wilson, 1990; Mouzos & West, 2007; Scerra, 2009). Researching this area in Australian homicide has highlighted gaps in knowledge, especially concerning victims and vulnerabilities. Over the 200 years examined in this study, there were 71 serial homicides, with 317 victims, committed by 82 or more perpetrators representing less than 1% of the total number of homicide victims. Most victims were vulnerable due to their isolation, gender, age, drug and alcohol use or mental health issues.

The chance of becoming a victim of a serial killer is quite low. However, the authors believe that it was critical to review the history of this phenomenon, test assumptions and understand victim vulnerabilities by highlighting patterns and trends for this crime type. It is critical for this applied research to add to the knowledge base and apprise police education, training and investigative practice.

This study mapped Australian serial homicide over time and reported on characteristics related to the victims, perpetrators, and features of the crime. Determining the similarities to previous international studies helped identify what was unique to serial homicide in the Australian context. These results and lines of inquiry may lead to a greater level of understanding from the criminal justice system and potentially decrease the average detection time from first killing to apprehension.

This study is the largest of its kind in Australia. It systematically recorded critical information for each recorded solved serial homicide and the factors that made up those crimes. It found similarities to extant research, such as most serial killers are male and most of their victims are females, however, it also found differences, such as victim's age. Future research will identify the specific vulnerabilities of the victims of Australian serial offenders and compare them within an international context. Although the number of serial homicide events has decreased during the past few decades in Australia, the question of whether this could change remains.

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Understanding victimological factors when analysing Organised Crime characteristics: A human trafficking perspective

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ABSTRACT

It was identified through this Australian study that organised crime groups operate in a variety of criminal markets and as a result the methods of organised crime groups also vary. Utilising the Sleipnir framework of Organised Crime to analyse the characteristics of organised crime groups, it emerged that the Sleipnir framework did not reflect the link or reliance an organised crime group may have on victims to succeed in their criminal endeavours. Human trafficking is a crime type where victimisation of an individual would be considered an essential element to undertake the crime. This led to the development of a Victimological Framework and further defined the organised crime attribute of 'victimisation'; which was incorporated into the research on the context of organised crime involvement in sex-trafficking crimes in Australia. Understanding and identifying an organised crime groups' ability and need to victimise individuals, groups or businesses is an important element to understanding the context of organised criminal offending.

Key Words: Victimology, Victimisation, Human trafficking, Sleipnir, Organised crime.

INTRODUCTION

Trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sex work has been estimated as the second most lucrative transnational crime, equal to illegal arms trading and second only to drug trafficking. Human trafficking is a crime that generates billions of dollars in profits for the traffickers. In 2012, the number of victims forced into sexual exploitation was estimated at 4.5 million world-wide. The International Labour Office also found that estimates on cross-border movement of trafficked persons is closely aligned with forced sexual exploitation; whereas a greater proportion of non-sexual forced labour are exploited in their home area (ILO, 2012). Furthermore, it was found that the average period that a victim spent in forced labour, including sexual exploitation, was approximately 18 months (ILO, 2012, p.17).

According to the 2018 *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons* (UNODC) there was a peak of 24,000 victims of human trafficking detected in 2016. More victims of human trafficking have been reported in 2016 than at any time in the past 13 years. There are several key findings highlighted, specifically, trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation accounts for 83 per cent of trafficking cases involving women and 72 per cent of trafficking cases involving girls. In general, traffickers tend to be adult males and nationals of the country in which they operate, but more women and foreign nationals are involved in trafficking in persons than most other crimes. Women account for 49 per cent of all trafficking victims detected globally; women and girls together account for about 72 per cent (UNODC, 2018,

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p.25). Of relevance to Australia is that the trafficking flow originating in East Asia remains the most prominent transnational flow globally and East Asian victims were detected in large numbers in many countries worldwide.

CAUSAL FACTORS

Unequal economic development in various part of the world including the Southeast Asian region is a hallmark of globalization. While the global economic amalgamation has led to several encompassing benefits such as foreign direct investments, stimulation of domestic and international trade, and advancements in knowledge transfer among countries, globalization also resulted in economic imbalance and monetary crisis among the developing and poor nations, widening the chasm between poor and rich as well as causing social instability at large (Mahalingam, 2019). The result is an increase in the international trade of human beings, particularly women and children who are vulnerable to exploitation (Okereke, 2005; Bales, 2003; Hughes, 2000).

Women and girls are bearing the brunt of the disparity in economic opportunities between developed and under-developed countries created by globalisation and are increasingly pressured to migrate to unfamiliar lands in search of work. In search of work, women are falling prey to being exploited and finding themselves involuntarily working in the sex industry or under conditions of sexual servitude. In the international trade in human beings, demand is critical because traffickers get involved to satisfy the demand of employers of illegal labour and the purchasers of sexual services (Bertone, 1999). Bales (2007) explored the 'push' and 'pull' factors arising from globalisation and contributing to the cause of human trafficking. The evidence from his study identified the 'push' factors which contributed to people wanting to leave a country as poverty, social unrest, government corruption, population pressure and the perception of opportunity (or lack thereof). Conversely, 'pull' factors that drive people to want to go to a country are the availability of employment, economic wellbeing, opportunity, the demographic profile and government corruption.

Although Shelley (2010) agrees that the root causes that allow human trafficking to exist are employment opportunities, poverty, economic imbalances, corruption, decline of border controls, political instability and gender discrimination, she argues that these conditions have existed for a very long time and alone do not explain the phenomenal growth of human trafficking since the mid-1980's. Shelley (2010) asserts that trafficking has increased dramatically with globalisation, the rise of illicit trade and the end of the Cold War leading to the decline of borders. At the same time, transnational crime groups exploit state-based systems and coordinated international efforts to address human trafficking have been absent (Shelley, 2010).

More recently, it has been recognised that armed conflict has led to increased human trafficking. In fact, many of the countries marked by conflict appear among the top ten countries with the highest prevalence of people trafficking. The role that conflict plays in compounding vulnerability is evident with observable governance issues, lack of basic needs, inequality and disenfranchised groups (Global Slavery Index, 2018)

Yea's (2004) analysis of factors said to cause trafficking, such as poverty, social disruption and employment opportunities are that these are not in fact causes, rather they are

vulnerabilities that leave a woman exposed to the possibility of trafficking. In Yea's view, the only cause of trafficking for sexual purposes is the male demand for women's sexual labour and the trafficker's demands for the large profits. Demand is a significant driver that fuels the growth of human trafficking (Shelley, 2010). In the case of prostitution, the destination for most women trafficked into the prostitution industry is countries and cities where there are large sex industry centres and where prostitution is legal or widely tolerated. According to Hughes, Sporcic, Mendelsohn and Chirgwin (1999), tolerance or legalisation of prostitution, pimping and brothels cause an increase in trafficking and smuggling to meet the demand created by a legitimised sex industry. One aspect of this study was to determine if there is a tendency of victims to come from particular countries and whether the legalised or tolerant regulatory environment in Australia contributes to the country becoming a destination country for victims of trafficking. Australia is ranked ninth behind Germany, the United States, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Greece, India and Thailand as the largest market for sex trafficked women and girls (Mizus, Moody, Privado, & Douglas, 2003). Dr Anne Gallagher (2009) advised the *Victorian Inquiry into people trafficking for sex work*, that 'the one constant [in the causes of trafficking] is that people are trafficked from less wealthy places to relatively more wealthy countries (Parliament of Victoria, 2010, p. 53).

VICTIMOLOGY

As an extension of consideration of macro-causal factors, an important consideration in cases of human trafficking is the interdependency between victims and offenders. Understanding the interdependency between victims and offenders provides policy makers or law enforcement agencies the opportunities for intervention. It also enables greater understanding of the enablers of human trafficking.

Victimology is a broad area of study encompassing theory, research, policy and practice. Victimological theories try to explain why it is that certain people, and particular groups of individuals, become victimised (Spalek, 2017). Doerner and Lab (2017) describes the emergence of general victimology as a field which separated the study of victimisation from that of criminology. Luty and Lanier (2012) described that victim offender interaction, repeat victimisation and lifestyle as being key factors characterising the nature of victimisation in sex trafficking. Luty and Lanier (2012) went on to integrate theories of victimology and criminology to understand human trafficking of women and girls for involuntary prostitution. This integration of theory was applied across the various phases of human trafficking, being recruitment, transportation, exploitation and harbouring and transfer. This current study has also used victimological theories to explore the type and level of victimisation that occurred across twenty-one ($n=21$) case studies in Australia. This is important to provide a holistic analysis of how organised crime networks identify, recruit, transport and exploit victims.

The study of victims and their relationship to the criminal act is often viewed under four theories: victim precipitation theory, the lifestyle theory, deviant place theory and the routine activity theory. The following are the key concepts in respect of the victimisation factors:

Location (deviant place theory) -

- there was no victim influence in the crime, either actively or passively;

- the individual was victimised due to the location they were in.

Personal circumstance (lifestyle theory) -

- the prime actors (victim and offender) had occasion to intersect in time and space;
- interaction occurs where the victim is perceived by the offender as an appropriate object of victimisation;
- victimisation was non-random;
- victimisation occurred as a result of the patterned routine of the individual's everyday activities (includes vocational activities such as work, school, shopping; as well as leisure activities, such as nightclubs, sport and hobbies).

Routine; although closely aligned to the Lifestyle theory, the three variables are based on the social space in which there is an opportunity for crime (Daigle & Muftic, 2020, p.4). Offenders are seen as active and the victim as passive and is linked to social issues that affect guardianship

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- the presence of at least one likely offender;
- the presence of at least one suitable target;
- the absence of capable guardians (who might prevent the crime).

Victim precipitation -

- the victim created a situation in which they were prone to victimisation (passive);
- the victim contributed to the interaction leading to the crime;
- the victim provoked the offending.

FRAMEWORK & DEFINITION DEVELOPMENT

Although there is literature that exists which discusses the causes of human trafficking, there were no tools that existed that suited a case study approach to exploring the context of victimisation in sex trafficking cases. Furthermore, given the nature of the crime, it was evident that various victimological theories could apply at various stages of the trafficking process.

Using the definition of trafficking in human beings from the Palermo Protocol, the phenomenon can be structured in three phases: recruitment, transport and exploitation (Stanojoska & Petrevski, 2014). For the development of the Victimological Indicators in this study, two further phases of the trafficking phenomenon were identified, being the harbouring and victim disposal phases. In the Australian context, recruitment of victims of trafficking generally takes place in the victim's country of origin. It often involves deceit in order to get the victim's agreement and mostly in cases when victims do not get information about the conditions in which they will be working, such as travelling to work abroad in a restaurant and then finding themselves working in a brothel.

In the Australian context, transport of victims by air is generally most common. However, globally, traffickers are specialist when it comes to moving people and Stanojoska & Petrevski (2014) recognise that in the context of trafficking in human beings, the organisers of transport routes have the most important roles in the crime syndicate.

By definition contained in the Palermo Protocol, exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery or the removal of organs. This study has focused on exploitation for the purposes of sexual exploitation and particularly the sex industry in Australia. In conjunction with exploitation phase, in the Australian context there is also the need to harbour a trafficked person. This harbouring phase in the first instance is often against the individual's will; they may be housed in a hotel with other victims of trafficking and transported daily by the organised crime syndicate to the brothel. During the harbouring phase the victim is often threatened, assaulted and manipulated through fear into abiding by the will of the traffickers.

The average period that a victim spent in forced labour, including sexual exploitation, was approximately 18 months (ILO, 2012, p.17). At a point in time the victim is either rescued, escapes or is discarded by the organised crime syndicate. It is important to distinguish this as a separate phase of the process, as it can often be the situation that victims are assaulted and threatened during this time. There have been instances where the traffickers just leave the victims locked up and abandon that component of the operation, leaving the victim vulnerable to death.

For this research, the framework below, Figure 1, was created to ensure a standardised presentation of victimisation factors that could be identified and consistent across each case study. For each case, the type of victimisation factors was identified from the data for each victim and recorded in the data collection matrix (Fig.1). This enabled analysis to take place of when and what type of victimisation occurred.

Victimological Indicators	Victimisation Factors			
	Location	Personal Circumstances	Routine	Victim Precipitation
Recruitment/Deception Phase				
Transport Phase				
Harbouring Phase				
Exploitation Phase				
Victim Disposal Phase				

Figure 1: Victimological Framework

This study also used the Sleipnir Model of Organised Crime to understand the characteristics of each organised crime network relevant to each case study. In 1999 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) developed an intelligence model that factors in the characteristics of organised crime. To assess indicators of organised crime activity and to

provide an ability to understand the context of organised crime involvement in any given case, the RCMP developed the Long Matrix for Organised Crime (RCMP, 2010) known as Sleipnir. The Long Matrix for Organised Crime uses a set of 12 attributes which breaks down the phenomenon of organised crime into the most important shared, observable qualities. The selected attributes of organised crime in rank order, are:

1.	Corruption (weighting 100)	The corruption of public officials through the practices of illicit influence, exploitation of weakness and blackmail. Also, the ability to place organised criminals or their associates into sensitive positions.
2.	Violence (weighting 70)	The use of violence, and intimidation through explicit or implicit threats of violence, against targets outside the group to further any organisational objective.
3.	Infiltration (weighting 55)	The efforts to gain a foothold within legitimate private organisations and businesses to further criminal activities. This control or influence may be used for: money laundering, establishing pretence of propriety, facilitating, protecting and concealing criminal enterprises, and/or for intelligence gathering.
4.	Money Laundering (weighting 43)	The process of legitimising cash or other assets obtained through illegal activities. Effective money laundering conceals the criminal origins and ownership of the funds, creates a legitimate explanation for the proceeds of crime and creates wealth over time.
5.	Collaboration (weighting 32)	The extent of collaborative links between this and other organised crime groups.
6.	Insulation (weighting 29)	The efforts to protect the main figures in the group from prosecution through the use of: subordinates, fronts, corruption and/or other means.
7.	Monopoly (weighting 29)	Control over one or more specific criminal activities within a geographic area of operations, with no tolerance for competition. This does not prevent partnerships of profitable convenience between or among organisations. Violence, intimidation and/or informing on competitors are common methods used to establish or maintain monopoly.
8.	Scope (weighting 27)	The geographic sphere of operations and influence of the organised crime group.
9.	Intelligence Use (weighting 25)	The intelligence/counter-intelligence and counter-surveillance capabilities of organised criminals. Used to defend themselves against law enforcement and rival groups, and to identify new targets.
10.	Diversification (weighting 24)	The extent to which the illicit activities of the group are diversified.
11.	Discipline (weighting 21)	The practice of coercing obedience to hold the organisation together. This includes the use of violence, intimidation and other sanctions or forms of coercion on group members and associates.
12.	Cohesion (weighting 20)	Strong bonds are fostered at both individual to individual, and individual to organisation levels to create criminal solidarity and common protection. The bonds can be created through such factors as common backgrounds, blood relationships, financial relationships, length of association and geographic origins. They can be instituted through rites of initiation and required criminal acts of loyalty.

(source: RCMP, 2010)

Table 1: Sleipnir Characteristics and Weighthing

Each of these attributes is measurable and weighted which provides a description about the nature of the organised crime group that is being analysed. The purpose of the Sleipnir technique was to rank the attributes of an organised crime group along the basis of the threat they pose to society. The Sleipnir technique has been accepted and used in Australia and in countries such as Belgium; and is seen as a technique that moves from description to explanation of organised crime (Black & Vander Beken, 2001). The Sleipnir model has been described by Zoutendijk (2010) as being much more scientifically solid than many other organised crime assessment methods. It was identified in this study that the current attributes of Sleipnir did not reflect the link or reliance an organised crime group may have on victims to succeed in their criminal endeavours. For example, for success in human trafficking operations the level of victimisation against an individual would be considered an essential element to undertake the crime. In contrast, crimes against statute, such as firearms trafficking, would have a lower level of victimisation as individuals or groups of people are unlikely to be harmed, injured or subject to economic loss to facilitate such a crime. It is asserted that understanding and identifying an organised crime groups ability and need to victimise individuals, groups or businesses is an important element to understanding the context of organised criminal offending. For the purposes of this study a definition of ‘victimisation’ was developed.

Victimisation (definition)

The infliction of harm, injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of rights on an individual, group or business in order to undertake or further criminal activities.

- High* The group actively identifies for targeting individuals, groups or businesses and has a demonstrated ability to victimise them in order to complete or further their criminal activities.
- Medium* The victimisation of individuals, groups or businesses is regular but coincidental to the group’s criminal activities.
- Low* Victimisation of individuals, groups or businesses is infrequent and only a by-product of the group’s criminal activities.
- Nil* There are no demonstrable activities considered to be victimisation.

It was important to understand the reliance an organised crime syndicate may have on victims to further their criminal endeavours, or whether victims were incidental to their criminal activity. Understanding victimological indicators and the level of victimisation associated with the criminal enterprise provides analysts and law-enforcement agencies greater opportunity to target and disrupt the organised crime group.

FINDINGS

This study analysed twenty-one ($n=21$) case studies of sex trafficking in Australia, where a total of seventy-two ($n=72$) victims were involved, see Figure 2 below. All the victims in the cases were female. The highest number of victims, being thirteen ($n=13$), were linked to one case (Operation Ekala), with all those victims originating from South Korea. In the more recent cases, South Korean victims featured more prominently. Victims originating from Thailand also featured prominently in the older investigations, with twelve Thai victims

featuring in Operation Cornsilk from 2007. Of note, other than in one case, where there was indication of underage prostitutes being involved, all other victims were over eighteen and predominantly aged in their twenties to thirties. All the victims that were identified originated from overseas, interestingly there were no victims from western nations being represented in the cases.

Upon analysis of the victim's mode of entry into Australia, the methods of securing entry into Australia was through the use of tourist visas or student visas. However, what was common across the majority of the cases was that the syndicate arranged for the issue of the visa along with travel documentation for the victims. It was due to this process that the syndicates used as an excuse the allocation of exorbitant debts against the victims.

Operation Name	South Korean	Thai	Malay	Chinese	Hong Kong	Indian	Russian	Total No. of Victims
Operation BURLYWOOD			7					7
BK and AM (Russian)							1	1
Operation BOLE	2							2
Operation BLUESTONE			2		2			4
Operation BISTRE						1		1
Operation BLUSH	2							2
Operation CERULEAN			1					1
Operation CORNSILK		12						12
Operation CRYOLITE		2						2
Operation EKALA	13							13
Operation MAROON	5							5
Operation ALIZARIN	2							2
Operation KITRINO	2							2
Operation MYRTLE								-
Operation SILVERSKY		1						1
Operation MAVRO				4				4
Operation PASTEL		4						4
Operation PRUSSIAN								-
Operation Raspberry				2				2
Operation SEABOARD		5						5
Operation VELETA	2							2
	28	24	10	6	2	1	1	72

Figure 2: Victim numbers and country of origin for each case.

Analysis of Victimisation

As previously described, victimisation is the infliction of harm, injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of rights on an individual, group or business in order for the organised crime group to undertake or further their criminal activities.

High level victimisation involves the group actively identifying for targeting individuals, groups or businesses and has a demonstrated ability to victimise them in order to complete or further their criminal activities. High level victimisation was observable in sixteen ($n=16$) of the case studies. This result is expected given that human trafficking is reliant on the exploitation of people in order to be a successful criminal enterprise. The common methodology is that vulnerable victims are identified and sourced from predominantly Asian countries. They are deceived as to the purpose or conditions of their travel to Australia. When in Australia, the victimisation level increases and the individuals are forced into conditions of sexual exploitation. In general, this is the most common methodology observable across the case studies.

Medium level victimisation occurs when the victimisation of individuals, groups or businesses is regular but coincidental to the group's criminal activities. There were five ($n=5$) criminal syndicates that only displayed a medium level of victimisation. This was predominantly due to the fact that these syndicates operated legitimate brothels and overall were not reliant on victims of trafficking in order to operate the business; however, they would regularly utilise trafficked women for sexual exploitation when the opportunity presented itself.

Low level victimisation occurs when the victimisation of individuals, groups or businesses is infrequent and only a by-product of the group's criminal activities. There were no case studies where low-level victimisation was observable in this study.

Nil - There are no demonstrable activities considered to be victimisation. There were no case studies where the data indicated the absence of victimisation in this study.

Overall victimological indicators

Figure 3, below, contains a frequency count of each time a victimisation indicator appeared in a case study. There are some key phases of the trafficking process in each case in which victimisation occurs, and the type of victimisation that occurs can differ. From analysing the qualitative data, it is evident that these commonalities occur due to the methodology used by organised crime syndicates to facilitate sex trafficking into Australia. For example, during the recruitment/deception phase of the trafficking process, it was common to see personal circumstances ($n=19$), routine ($n=18$) and victim precipitation ($n=17$) all observable. The manner in which most victims were identified and recruited in their country of origin was fairly consistent across most cases. During this phase, there was no indication of deviant place theory in the data.

The victimological factors observable in the transport phase of the trafficking process were minimal. In two ($n=2$) case studies (Operation Prussian and Operation Veleta) there was indication of routine and victim precipitation as a victimisation factor; however, this is based on the fact that the victims were accompanied on the plane by one of the syndicate members and an inference is drawn that they are under escort. In the other cases, the data indicated that

the victims were all willing to travel to Australia of their own volition and were not subject to any level of victimisation during this phase.

Victimological Indicators (Overall comparison)	Victimisation Factors			
	Location	Personal Circumstances	Routine	Victim Precipitation
Recruitment/Deception Phase	0	19	18	17
Transport Phase	0	0	2	2
Harbouring Phase	19	1	17	1
Exploitation Phase	20	2	19	2
Victim Disposal Phase	1	1	1	0

Figure 3: Overall comparison of victimological indicators

There were clear commonalities in both the harbouring and the exploitation phase as they are similar in respect of the methodology of trafficking, as in most cases they tend to occur at the same time as each other. Also evident was the shift in victimisation factors from the recruitment/deception phase, as the victims had since arrived in Australia and were even further isolated. It was observable in Fig.3 above, that location and routine feature prominently and consistently across most cases. Location as a victimisation factor is based on the premise that the victim does not contribute to the crime as they have found themselves in a bad location, which is generally what happens when they find themselves being held in accommodation controlled by the criminal syndicate. Consistent with routine as a victimisation factor, at the same time, there is an absence of capable guardians and a motivated offender. There are only a few instances across the sample where personal circumstances and victim precipitation still featured in the data during the harbouring and exploitation phases.

In all but two of the cases in the sample, the victims were located by authorities and removed from the exploitive conditions; however, in two of the cases there was data indicating the victims had been 'disposed' of by being left behind by the traffickers or escaping and were still being threatened. Therefore, there are limited victimisation indicators during this phase of the trafficking process in the cases forming this sample.

DISCUSSION

Victimology is a very important consideration when analysing people trafficking cases. It is evident that the crime of trafficking in persons is reliant on the criminal syndicate identifying and then recruiting a certain type of victim. It has been observed through this study that the majority of victims are from Asia, with two case studies involving victims of Russian and Indian origin. Origin of country is an important consideration as it was observed that the syndicates in this study particularly targeted victims due to some common features which made all the victims susceptible and vulnerable to being trafficked and exploited. The majority of the victims were from poor socio-economic backgrounds, whether it be from a particular region

of a country, or just a particularly poor family. Often women were working in massage parlours in their own country and were lured to Australia based on the promises of lucrative earnings for doing the same thing, only to find the conditions were not as described; they were then isolated, exploited and dependent on the trafficking syndicate for survival. Similarly, there were incidents observed where the promise of education and jobs were made which would earn the victims far more money than they could in their own countries. A common exploitive condition identified in this study was the use of debt bondage, which occurred during both the harbouring and exploitation phases. For example, in the case of Operation Burlywood, it was identified that a group of ten Malaysian victims were forced into a bonded debt of between \$50,000 to \$60,000 AUD and the victims were required to have unprotected and unsafe sex until their debts were paid off. The victims in the case of Operation Burlywood all lived in one apartment in Sydney and some reported that they personally and their families had been threatened if they tried to leave.

Violence is a significant characteristic of organised crime and is weighted heavily in the Sleipnir model. The cases analysed in this study indicated that violence against the victims, particularly threats and intimidation were consistently used during the harbouring and exploitation phases to ensure compliance and obedience by the victims. The findings of this study are consistent with numerous government reports and other studies. For example, the Parliament of Victoria (2010) inquiry into people trafficking for sex work found consistently there was a 'breaking-in' stage when women first arrived in Australia, which included removal of passports, being locked in rooms, escorted to and from the brothel to the place of accommodation, general isolation, and not being provided money. Fergus (2005) found that victims were often raped and beaten for the purpose of breaking their resistance and ensuring their compliance, this included rape, physical violence, starvation, and threats of harm to the women's families which were all used to instil fear and punish those who resist or try to escape. Similarly, analysis of a business model of trafficking in human beings identified that violence was a significant methodology employed by the crime syndicates (Aronowitz et al., 2010). In this study, violence was never perpetrated against a victim during the recruitment phase; it was only when the victims arrived in Australia that the violence began within the harbouring and exploitation phases.

The findings of this current study are consistent with some of the related crimes identified in the trafficking process outlined in the study by Aronowitz et al. (2010); in particular, during the 'exploitation' phase. There were numerous examples identified in the case studies of victims being beaten, one being raped by seven men at one time and one being forcibly injected with drugs. The common theme of violence as a tool used by the syndicates has existed for many years. The principal means of control is dislocation of victims from their social networks. Additionally, manipulation through perverted social relationships, close monitoring, intimidation and outright violence is also used to control victims (Kleemans & Smit, 2014) when they reach the destination country in which they are exploited.

Nguyen (2010) detailed that the rate of poverty is so much higher in Asian countries that young girls are often sold into sexual slavery and due to the involvement of organised crime syndicates, victims generally do not seek out local authorities or help for fear of retaliation against themselves and their families. Also, due to the victims' understanding of the legal system and isolation from society, they were reluctant to cooperate with law

enforcement agencies. Healey (2012) described that human trafficking as driven by supply and demand, and a lack of protection, poverty, a lack of access to employment and education, discrimination of minorities and cultural practices are all factors that make children and adults vulnerable to being exploited. He further detailed that due to these factors, these vulnerable groups were more easily manipulated, tricked or forced by traffickers into exploitive situations. This was evident when analysing the victimology in the twenty-one ($n=21$) case studies in this research. It was clear that the exploitive conditions imposed by the trafficking syndicates work because of the background, origin, social standing, level of education and isolation of the victim. Victim identification and recruitment was a significant element of the context of organised crime activity when it relates to sex trafficking in Australia.

Conclusion

It was identified in designing the methodology for this research that the Sleipnir model lacked reference to victimological indicators. In the paradigm of human trafficking, victims are an essential element for any organised crime group to succeed (Langhorn, 2018, p.21). However, it was identified that there are variations in the methodology of organised criminal enterprises and in some cases individual victims were not a central part of the operating model of the enterprise. For this study, a further attribute was developed and defined to add to the Sleipnir model of organised crime. From the findings in this study, understanding an organised crime groups' reliance and focus on victims adds to the overall understanding of the context of that crime group and provides enhanced intelligence. If a law enforcement or intelligence agency chose to incorporate 'victimisation' as an attribute, they would need to undertake a Delphi survey to realign the requisite attribute weightings and determine the order of priority the 'victimisation' attribute would receive (Langhorn, 2018, p.21).

Literature exists which discusses the causes of human trafficking; however, there were no analytical tools that existed to explore the context of victimisation in sex trafficking cases. It was identified that various victimological theories could apply at various stages of the trafficking process. For this study, a framework was developed to ensure a standardised presentation of victimological indicators across each case. This framework involved the incorporation of four known victimological theories: victim precipitation theory, the lifestyle choice theory, deviant place theory and the routine activity theory. The use of victimological theory and the ability to analyse this across case studies proved a useful tool for this study and further development of such a framework as an analytical tool across other crime types or as a general analytical tool would be of benefit to future research, as well as law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This approach to theory integration was previously undertaken by Luty and Lanier (2012) who explored victim offender interaction, repeat victimisation and lifestyle as factors that describe the nature of victimisation of human trafficking for involuntary prostitution. The integration of victimological theories by Luty and Lanier (2012) resulted in recommendations to explain and respond successfully to the challenges faced by victims. The implementation of measures to improve and standardise the collection of data is a key initiative of the Australian Government's National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking and Slavery 2015-19 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014). Part of this is the approach recommended by Bricknell and Renshaw (2015) to develop a conceptual framework to examine human trafficking, in which characteristics of victims are understood. This can be built into a broader human trafficking monitoring program.

In this study, the use of a victimological framework also identified factors or opportunities in which disruption of the trafficking process can occur in Australia or overseas. For example, in the Australian context, victims of trafficking are transported through airports and are schooled on what to say to immigration officials. By understanding this context improved intelligence gathering and disruption activities may be further developed. It was also evident that during the exploitation phase, location and routine was a victimisation factor. This is predominantly due to the isolation of the victim and the lack of capable guardians to intervene. Understanding that this is the case, improved policy and training can be developed in areas such as regulatory compliance visits of licensed brothels, intelligence collection and investigation of workers backgrounds, which could provide greater opportunity for disruption and intervention of victimisation. A conceptual victimological framework, as used in this study, could provide information and data to inform decision making in this respect.

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Home Security and Emergency Response: The Convenience vs Security Trade-off

Tegg Westbrook¹

ABSTRACT

The world is increasingly becoming more digitalised as advanced technologies become more affordable and easier to use. Growing digitalisation conjures up many questions about if the “rewards” and added convenience of connectivity outweigh the supposed “risks.” Such risks include peoples’ overdependency, reliability and trust on technologies to provide safety, security and privacy in homes and workplaces; people’s general lack of security consciousness and security hygiene; as well as the (un)suitability of technologies and the strategic use of those technologies to mitigate crime and safety/health risk. Growing “security consumerism” means that nations’ citizens now have an important part to play in improving efficiency in emergency response. It is yet to be known, however, whether smart home security appliances are better than passive or monitored alarm systems, and whether added convenience of home automation is supplementary with the security returns. Using a Security Equilibrium Matrix based on literature review and meta-data analysis, this article hypothesises that smart home security appliances provide more security “returns” than passive alarms with the caveat that cyber security and privacy is sacrificed. It argues that the trade-offs between security and convenience is deeply contextual, and this ultimately affects emergency response on a macro-scale. It argues that technology firms have a huge part to play in reducing the variance between the identified convenience-security trade-offs.

Key Words: Smart home security, Alarm systems, Emergency sesponse, Cyber security, Privacy, Convenience.

INTRODUCTION

Market research suggests that smart home security appliances (SHSA) are proliferating at a very high rate in the world (Statista, 2020). Smart home security appliances encompass a range of affordable interoperable “install yourself” technologies including Personal Assistants (e.g. Alexa Guard, Google Home), security cameras, sensors, geofences, light and shade devices, as well as multi-purpose technologies such as “smart toys” and audio and entertainment systems (e.g. incorporated with cameras). This has been enabled by innovations in wireless communication systems, private competition, and affordable and distributable devices produced with low labour costs. They are typically used within the territory of the homeowner, but data can now be shared with trusted neighbours to enable collective neighbourhood safety. Homeowners may also use appliances to keep an eye on disabled or elderly relatives, young children, and pets. Overall, smart home security appliances, used inter-operably, can incorporate up to five “senses” – see (e.g. cameras), hear (e.g. personal assistants), smell (e.g. smoke alarms), touch (e.g. motion sensors), taste (e.g. carbon monoxide detectors) which are inter-operable with Personal Assistants (“tell”) or other systems designed to notify homeowners, see Figure 1 below.

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


Figure 1: Five Smart Home Security “Senses”

While “security consumerism” and IoT adoption appears to be increasing (Alperovich et al, 2019), global regulatory frameworks for IoT security appliances is fragmentary, with some regulatory frameworks in some countries lacking, whilst others more advanced (ETSI, 2020). Even the most proactive regulatory approaches may lag technological changes, dynamic consumer habits, and criminal adaptations. Academic literature on smart home appliances is largely confined to the computer sciences, and very little attention has been dedicated to exploring the positive or negative societal security impacts of this proliferation, particularly from a theoretical perspective that considers an “equilibrium” of risk acceptance, rewards, issues and faults. Indeed, beyond the possibility that there has been security enhancement in countries where security consumerism is high (Farrell, 2013); various academics, institutions, and media have reported numerous privacy and cyber-security issues with SHSA. For example, Alperovich et al (Abstract, 2019) found that nearly 50% of TP-Link home routers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have guessable passwords, and in North America, it is 17%. Recent studies have confirmed that consumers are growing more concerned about privacy and data security following numerous media reports of instances of privacy breaches by well-known brands such as Amazon, Google, and Nest (see Agarwal et al, 2020). The use of SHSA has also been attributed to psycho-social issues, for example neighbourhood security appliances conjuring “stranger danger” feelings and racial profiling (Walsh, 2020). On the other side of the argument, some findings have indicated that smart homes and “smart neighbourhoods” have improved security for residents and contribute to speeding up verification of dangers and response times for emergency services (ibid). Investment in home security has been attributed with lower levels of burglaries in many advanced economies (Farrell, 2013). In some areas of the world, such as the USA, security services are working more closely with large technology firms to harness the benefits of wireless infrastructures (Paul, 2019), especially with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This is viewed with alarm by pro-privacy actors who fear the creeping normalisation of mass surveillance. In this respect, other sources point to the issue that collaboration between tech companies and emergency responders has shown no decrease in intrusions in homes (Ng, 2019). Fundamentally, this begs the question about whether security consumerism is offering more rewards than risks to homeowners and making emergency response more efficient and effective.

It is therefore important to understand how the added convenience of home automation is supplemented with added “security returns” for homeowners. Such information will aid

scholars and practitioners to understand the opportunities and limitations of smart home appliances, and understand their impact on the safety of homeowners and in terms of improved efficiency of emergency responders. From an academic perspective, the absence of a matrix that helps to simplify the multi-dimensional issues of digital home security requires dedicated attention. The development and use of a matrix will help us hypothesise the linkage between digitisation, (in)security, risk acceptance, (in)efficiencies, and the sacrifice of normal values such as rights to privacy.

Security Trade-offs

There are three fundamental issues that require addressing in relation to whether security appliances provide an overall “security return” to society: (1) whether smart home security appliances speed up verification and response to safety and security issues better than monitored and passive alarms; (2) whether digitisation is better than other traditional deterrents used in the home; (3) whether cyber vulnerability is an acceptable risk if the rewards and added convenience are much higher.

It is important to first emphasise the differences between passive and monitored alarm systems and smart home security appliances. Passive alarms systems are alarms with no notification mechanism. Passive alarms are often ignored which means that repeatedly there is a slow response to the issues causing the alarm. There are also high rates of “false alarms” – for example, fire alarms being triggered by toasters, or motion sensors triggered by wind. Monitored alarms, on the other hand, are directly linked to a security firm or emergency responders. A faster emergency response is more assured. However, monitored alarms are far more expensive to install and still suffer from false alarms, leading to collateral costs and wasted time for responders, meaning that these alarms usually have to meet certain standards in some countries (e.g. see Salt Lake City Police Department, 2004, National Security Inspectorate, 2020). Many smart home security appliances, on the other hand, which are connected via the internet and communicate to each other via low bandwidth waves like Bluetooth, are designed to detect and notify the homeowner of an alarm activation via their control system. These are more advanced than passive alarms because the homeowner can verify the seriousness of the alarm if, for example, they have visual verification of what is causing the alarm via a “smart camera.” It is unknown, however, whether smart home security appliances ensure lower rates of false alarms or whether they speed up emergency response. Many factors can delay a message getting to a homeowner, including the reliability of the internet connection, or simply because the quality of the appliances in the home are of poor standard.

Thus, it is unclear whether smart security appliances are more effective at detecting and notifying of home intrusions and health and safety risks than what is already available on the specialised home alarm market. With regards to home burglaries, whilst smart homes have matured over previous years through the advancement of ICT technologies, it has yet to prove itself over traditional physical deterrents and specialist monitored alarm systems (Brown, 2018). This is despite there being a range of quality systems (e.g. appliances with AI), as well as a higher quantity of systems (cheap and distributed around the home). It also matters about the end-user associations with appliances, with, for example, non-specialists installing digital appliances that might be inadequate, unsafe or unfit for purpose. For example, it has been argued that the vast majority of SHSA contribute mostly to the ‘detection’ and ‘response’ elements of a ‘defence in depth’ strategy (detect, deter, delay, respond), and less so on the ‘deterrence’ and ‘delay’ elements (Westbrook, in press). Similarly, many SHSA score relatively low on ‘scenario depth’, i.e. a spectrum of threats that the security ‘layers’ – including digital appliances – are designed to deal with. Thus, smart homes may be better

protected from some health, safety and security issues more so than others, meaning that more appliances may be needed to mitigate other risks, or more specialist devices and information may be warranted (ibid). Thus, the benefits of digitisation could be fantasy and downfalls might be merely human-centric. No scaled research so far has tried to identify and, if appropriate, rectify these problems.

With regards to cyber security, there have been many studies that have pointed out the multiplication of entry points in appliances for “tech-savvy” hackers to exploit. Edu, Such and Suarez-Tangil (2019), for example, outline a number of elements that expose personal assistants to various risks, and Jose and Malekian (2015) provide a long list of reasons why homeowners might disregard cyber security. Indeed, cyber security is high on the agenda during the COVID-19 pandemic since many workers are working from home and using less secure devices and applications that what might be available in the workplace. With regards to cybercrime, media and (non-)governmental organisations have warned that criminals are adapting to the challenges that are confronting them and looking for alternative ways to make money. This places more focus on the safeguards and effectiveness of our digital appliances. The impact of “crime displacement” requires more dedicated research, in particular, how home isolation has reduced home burglaries, and how criminals are turning to cyber-crime as a consequence of lost revenues (Europol, 2020). To put it into greater perspective, breaking and entering into residential dwellings have declined, locally and nationally, in some advanced economies (Office for National Statistics, 2020, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2020, Ashby, 2020). The equilibrant is that cybercrime has increased. In particular, there has been an upsurge of data-harvesting and disruptive malware (Interpol, 2020) which can target smart home devices. There are other well-known motivations for hacking into smart homes that may be more appealing during ‘stay at home’ periods, including methods to gather information about the occupants, as well as harass and inconvenience homeowners, and enable break-ins (Chang, 2019). Thus, it could be perceived that during the COVID-19 pandemic, our physical property is less likely to be stolen, but our digital property is more vulnerable to theft and exploitation than ever before.

Media and academic attention on the privacy implications of appliances is extensive, but very little has focussed on the balance between the sacrifice of privacy in return for other security returns (see Choo and Sarre, 2015 for legislative and policy dilemmas). Overall, the reason why privacy is challenged in smart homes is because of the heterogeneous, dynamic, and Internet-connected nature of our lifestyles that makes private data more accessible and hence more vulnerable. There is also a lack of “privacy-assured” products because many companies that sell smart appliances benefit in some way by gathering data about the home and homeowner (Molla, 2019). This is in part due to lack of national international standards as well as the will to regulate the industry. Similarly, while consumer demands for better privacy safeguards appears to be increasing (see Agarwal et al, 2020, p. 1), as demonstrated in Mozilla’s (2021) “*privacy not included” webpage, privacy-assurance is not a top priority for major brands, leaving little choice to the consumer. Similarly, consumers may state that privacy is a key aspect of their buying choices but may not ensure this (Molla, 2019).

Likewise, some aspects of home security might benefit from using covert security appliances, meaning that visitors and family members might not be aware that they are being surveilled. Indeed, home isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic for many families may have challenged people’s sense of privacy between household members and from potential hackers, thus challenging the normal social structures, values and trust that we hold most dear in our homes. Overall, this brings us back the question about whether added convenience, such as improved efficiency and peace of mind, is a sufficient trade-off for sacrificing some values and exposing homes to certain risks.

TOWARDS A COHERENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECURITY EQUILIBRIUM OF SECURITY APPLIANCES

Understanding how effective and safe smart security appliances are is only a component part to the safety of citizens. However, understanding the opportunities and threats presented by smart security appliances could have a significant impact in mitigating issues (time wasted etc.) experienced by emergency services attending false alarms or attending alarms too late. But these can be influenced by many factors, including infrastructural factors (internet connection in rural areas, for example), systemic issues (quality and interoperability between appliances, technical performance of appliances, the quality of the verification mechanism), appropriate end-use of systems (risk perception of the end-user, strategic and appropriate use of appliances), and the quality of the control system that verifies the homeowner (e.g. push notifications can drain battery power, and therefore are often turned off). Communication issues could mean the difference between attending an alarm on time or too late. The speed of the notification and verification could be influenced by, for example, systemic issues. Blurred images can often be caused by poor internet connection or Bluetooth configuration.

Without dedicated research, the abovementioned issues and questions are based mostly on conjecture. Nevertheless, supposing that smart security appliances score high or low in various “security equilibrium,” we can hypothesise whether they provide a “security return.” Table 1, below, shows a simplistic matrix of “high” to “low” equilibrium based on qualitative assumptions.

	High Equilibrium	Medium/Imbalanced Equilibrium	Low Equilibrium
Detection and response	Response has improved. SHSA are similar in effectiveness or better than monitored alarms. Efficient.	Response is more effective than passive alarms, but not better than monitored alarms.	Response has not improved despite proliferation. Inefficient.
Cyber-Security	Smart appliances leave little or no opportunity for attack or manipulation.	Appliances have some security safeguards, but also some vulnerabilities that are detrimental to overall security.	Many appliances are insecure. They open more doors to intrusion. Counterproductive.
Privacy	Data is anonymised and not shared with third parties. All household members are aware of security appliances in the home.	Some data is shared with third parties. Some appliances offer some safeguards, whilst others do not	All data is shared to third parties without the homeowner’s full consent. This data can be leaked and accessed by cyber criminals.

Table 1: Security Equilibrium Matrix

Based on academic and media discussions on smart home security appliances (but with the absence of solid data to inform our decisions), for the sake of advancing this discussion, we can postulate that detection and response, cyber security, and privacy, score a “medium” equilibrium score. Indeed, a large sample testing of appliances in homes, as well as engagement with first responders, and understanding homeowners’ cyber security hygiene and feelings about privacy, would be one methodology to undertake. This is not within the scope of this study, however.

If detection and response is “medium” score, and assuming that end-users are using their appliances appropriately, then this would mean overall security enhancement for homeowners with a range of SHSA. Added convenience – though hard to measure – would also be a bonus since this is a primary selling point for the smart home market. If privacy is at a medium score, however, this would mean sacrificing some values. Passive alarms systems do not typically put privacy values at stake because they are not for the purpose of gathering data about the occupants; but this, hypothetically, is to the detriment of a homes’ security potential. This means that homeowners (without monitored alarms) need to negotiate a trade-off between (1) less privacy = greater security and safety, or (2) higher levels of privacy = lower levels of security and safety. The contrasts between the former (1) trade-off could be alleviated if, for example, homeowners notify relatives/visitors about the use of security appliances around the home – such as cameras, microphones and other sensors. Fundamentally, this means that privacy in the home is highly contextual for the end-user and indeed based upon the end-user’s acceptance that their data is used and shared by the manufacturers of those appliances. Similarly, many homeowners see value in sharing their data if it means receiving targeted and catered marketing material.

What is absent from the discussion is that other appliances that typically do not have a security function (i.e. a feature that detects and/or notifies the homeowner of security issue, or deters criminals from break-in attempts), such as energy monitors, connected taps, refrigerators, kettles etc. – also gather data about us, but in return help us to reduce our energy consumption, control our lights and devices and so forth. Again, the relative low cost of smart appliances might provide a quick return on investment with the end-user’s knowledge that they have to sacrifice some privacy and accept some level of cyber risk. The trade-off might be that smart homeowners feel that the risk of cyber-crime and misuse of the data gathered about them is a low risk. Similarly, if the incorporation of security appliances lowers insurance premiums, there are more gains. All told, with cybercrime increasing and burglaries decreasing during the COVID-19 pandemic, ‘digital intrusion’ may make homes and occupants less safe, at least in the foreseeable future. This means that occupants should consider contextually if the chances of physical intrusion are lowered and if digital intrusion is enhanced.

Based on the matrix, we can conclude that safety and security is enhanced with the sacrifice of our privacy and cybersecurity – i.e. data that is shared with third parties, data that is controlled by one or more household members, or data that is shared with neighbours or even the emergency services. Thus, investing in smart home security appliances is risk-reward calculation for most homeowners. Ultimately, this has an effect on emergency response, and it leads us to question how the smart home sector can influence the shift from a “medium” to a “high” security equilibrium and change the status quo.

DISCUSSION

The idea of home security is changing with connectivity. Advanced security technologies are now more affordable, convenient, easy to use, and can even provide a measurable return – financial or otherwise – for the investment. Digitisation – either with progressive or regressive social and political consequences – has altered the nature of societal security and added more questions than answers about if the “rewards” and added convenience of digitisation outweigh the supposed “risks.” Such risks include peoples’ overdependency, reliability and trust on technologies to provide safety, security and privacy in homes and workplaces; people’s general lack security consciousness and security hygiene; as well as the (un)suitability of technologies and the strategic use of those technologies to mitigate crime and safety/health risk. These sorts of issues bring us to question the role of homeowners in improving emergency response, based on their own abilities to verify the seriousness of alarms before they call emergency responders.

No dedicated study has sought to compare smart home security appliances with passive or monitored alarms, despite the potential to reduce the number of false alarms. Neither have they sought to hypothesise how homeowners might sacrifice some values and expose themselves to certain risks in order to receive certain security returns. Using a security equilibrium matrix, this article has hypothesised that if smart home security appliances score “medium” equilibrium (based on academic and media sources) then smart home security appliances are better than passive alarm systems, with the caveat that some cyber-security and privacy is thereby sacrificed. This leaves a clear message for those who want better cyber security and privacy: they would have to invest in expensive monitored alarms systems *or* sacrifice some level of safety and security by having exclusively passive alarms installed in the home. It therefore concludes that our conceptions of safety, security and convenience, and the trade-offs we make between them, is deeply contextual, and this ultimately has an immeasurable impact the efficiencies of emergency response on a macro-scale.

This leads us to question how we can move – hypothetically – from a “medium” security equilibrium to a “high” equilibrium, which theoretically should lead to safer and more secure homes and businesses. The smart home security sector will need to identify how automated places can reach the level of reliability that monitored alarms provide whilst at the same time reduce the likelihood of false alarms. Likewise, technology firms must leave very little or no opportunity for cyber interference in order to carry more legitimacy in the home security sector. Technology firms must also figure out how data can be better anonymised and how privacy-breaches can be better handled and communicated between different household members and neighbours. The simple conclusion here is that technology firms have a huge part to play in reducing the variance between the convenience-security trade-offs, and thus ultimately improving emergency responses.

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
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**Terrorism and counter terrorism:
a comprehensive introduction to actors and actions.**

*By Henry Prunckun and Troy Whitford
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London
2019, paperback, 269 pages
ISBN: 9781626377608*

Reviewed by Cesar Alvarez.



The old adage says ‘never judge the book by the cover’. But just by reading the title on the cover, it is clear that Henry Prunckun and Troy Whitford set themselves up to a challenging task.

Terrorism and counter terrorism are mammoth-size concepts. Their actors are numerous and arguably expanding. Their actions are complex and their political, social, and economic ramifications run deep in government, security and societal structures. Introducing both concepts, and to do so comprehensively, is indeed easier said than done. Prunckun and Whitford, however, not only rise to the occasion, but more importantly, they have produced a practical, easy-to-read, and timely learning tool for students with little or no previous exposure to terrorism-related issues, either professionally or academically.

Prunckun and Whitford begin by rightly pointing out that terrorism has now become an almost daily occurrence, but paradoxically, despite its commonality, there still no universal consensus on its definition. This sets the scene for the reader to grasp the complexities surrounding terrorism and subsequently counter terrorism. From there, Prunckun and Whitford take the reader through a quick overview of the history of terrorism, ranging from the Zealots to the 20th century in just a couple of pages. This brushstroke is then followed by what might be called a hyphenated taxonomy of terrorism — namely, left-wing terrorism, eco-terrorism, right-wing terrorism, and even anti-abortion terrorism, as well as other forms of terrorism. While Prunckun and Whitford rely, with good reasons, on the most common means to typify terrorist organisations —through the analysis of its goals, it should be noted that further emphasis on David Rapoport’s Four ‘Waves’ of Terrorism would have added clarity and depth to this section.

The authors then focus on the detailed examination of operational aspects associated with the planning, financing and execution of terrorist attacks. From recruitment to the selection of targets, touching also on the role organised crime has in the prospects of success of a terrorist operation, Prunckun and Whitford paint a wide picture of what contemporary terrorist operations entail. Their picture, nevertheless, does not manage to capture neither lightly, let alone in detail, any of the main —active or extinct—contemporary organisations or individuals within the terrorist ‘landscape’. Students, in particular those in the early stages of their journey throughout the terrorism and counter terrorism concepts, would have benefited greatly from an overview of some terrorist agents who have been behind some of the major terrorist operations. Ironically, while Prunckun and Whitford excluded an examination of terrorist organisations and individuals from the book, they dedicated (and rightly so) an entire chapter to the victims of terrorism, providing the reader with unique perspective on terrorism-

related issues.

Prunckun and Whitford start off Part 2 — counter terrorism—by examining the international legal instruments against terrorism (ILIAT), a group of more than twenty-one international conventions, as well as, UN Security Council Resolutions developed by the international community since 1963 to respond to the different manifestations of terrorism and terrorist financing. This appears to be one of the main qualities of this book: having personally worked for the UN building capacities in criminal justice systems across Latin America, and having seen how unfamiliar experienced practitioners were with the ILIAT, I firmly believe students will benefit immensely by the overview on the ILIAT. This international criminal law perspective strips terrorism from its ideological and political nature, simplifies a highly complex concept, and expands the reader's knowledge in often overlooked area. The authors quickly turn the reader's attention towards operational and strategic counter terrorism elements, essentially arguing that there is no silver bullet to prevent terrorism, let alone to combat it. From the role law enforcement and defence forces play in disruption operations, to the challenges military interventions create to the overall deterrence of terrorist threats at home and abroad, the authors emphasise that, although responses to terrorism vary from country to country, the protection of critical infrastructure and the de-radicalisation of extremists are and will likely remain a common trend.

In Part 3, and to conclude, Prunckun and Whitford ventured to answer whether the war on terror can ever be won. There is certainly merit in the authors' intention to move the reader's understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism from the operational to the strategic; furthermore, it makes sense to ground a prospective on the theoretical concepts, particularly towards the end of the book. Yet, the authors could have perhaps devoted this section to discuss other key issues the book did not cover. After all, as motioned before, terrorism and counter terrorism are mammoth-size concepts.

Essentially, Prunckun and Whitford took up on an ambitious task, and delivered. They managed to break not one but two broad and equally deep concepts into small, and easy-to-read pieces. Their contribution is to be understood in terms of 'breadth' rather than 'depth'; nonetheless, newcomers into terrorism studies would appreciate that.

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